Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

Altamaimi, Mohammed; Weiss, Martin B. H.; McHenry, Mark

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2310883

Cited by 20 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The general characteristics of the enforcement of rights were explained in many papers, but it was applied to spectrum sharing in [5]. These characteristics are [3,5]: 1) enforcement timing action (ex-ante or ex-post); 2) sanctions form; 3) party (ies) of carrying out the enforcement.…”

Section: Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These characteristics are [3,5]: 1) enforcement timing action (ex-ante or ex-post); 2) sanctions form; 3) party (ies) of carrying out the enforcement.…”

Section: Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The value for these covered areas approximately is worth $119 million [5] which is a good incentive for SU to pay for sharing the spectrum within these areas. This value was calculated using the spectrum value opportunity that is used by the wireless operator to calculate spectrum value.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The design of the overall enforcement system may give more emphasis to one or the other. The emphasis in commercial-government sharing in the United States has been on ex-ante measures [4,5]. Determining the role of ex-post enforcement in a spectrum sharing scheme is of significant importance since spectrum sharing will inevitably result in interference events.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ex-Post Enforcement in Spectrum Sharing

Malki

Weiss

2014

SSRN Journal

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Spectrum sharing is emerging as a key strategy for future wireless communications systems. Enforcement is a requirement for spectrum sharing to protect the incumbent of the spectrum from bad interference. Practical schemes have linked together ex-ante and ex-post enforcement. The design of the overall enforcement system may give more emphasis to one or the other. The emphasis in commercial-government sharing in the United States has been on ex-ante measures [4,5]. Determining the role of ex-post enforcement in a spectrum sharing scheme is of significant importance since spectrum sharing will inevitably result in interference events. To evaluate the role of the ex-post enforcement approach, we will consider numerical examples where we compare the cost of the ex-post only enforcement to the cost of the ex-ante only enforcement on one of the suggested bands for spectrum sharing (1695-1710 MHz). The cost of the ex-post enforcement in our model depends on the penalty value that Primary User (PU) uses to control interference events and the probability of detecting the interference. The penalty value depends on two factors which are changeable and unchangeable enforcement costs. The cost of the ex-post only enforcement has two variables that affect it, which are probability of detection; and the changeable enforcement cost. The numerical results show how these two variables affect one another, and their effect on the radius of the penalty zone. It also shows the maximum changeable enforcement cost that would be feasible.

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Section: Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These characteristics are [3,5]: 1) enforcement timing action (ex-ante or ex-post); 2) sanctions form; 3) party (ies) of carrying out the enforcement.…”

Section: Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ex-Post Enforcement in Spectrum Sharing

Malki

Weiss

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…They also argue that spectrum sharing requires an organized market, in which a regulator could well play a role just like today in organized markets for electricity. ALTAMIMI, WEISS and MCHENRY (2013) analyze enforcement issues for spectrum sharing by government agencies, but similar enforcement issues need to be addressed by sharing between private parties. In particular, there are tradeoffs between ex ante rules that avoid interference and ex post rules on monitoring and compensation.…”

Section: Licenses and Associated Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Vogelsang

2013

Review of Economics

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Telecommunications policy has come a long way from regulation of vertically integrated monopolies to the current state of competition. As competition becomes selfsustainable, will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away or, if not, what form will it take? The economics literature suggests that the regulatory efficiency frontier is shifted by new technological and market developments, such as convergence of networks, fixed-mobile substitution (and integration) and next generation access networks. The frontier is also affected by the existing capital stock and other physical and institutional characteristics of a country. The insights from a review of the theoretical and empirical literature are applied to five policy areas. They are: (1) termination monopoly; (2) local bottleneck access; (3) net neutrality; (4) spectrum management; and (5) universal service. While in some of them, deregulation and a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, regulation will remain efficient in others for some time. Deregulation will likely become efficient for one-way access and universal service, with the exception of some universal service policies in remote areas and for the poor. Termination will move to bill and keep with a duty to interconnect. In addition, some (more symmetric) regulation should persist for net neutrality in the form of transparency requirements, (quasi-) common carrier obligations and minimum quality standards. Also, spectrum management, while moving towards full-blown ownership rights, will continue to see regulators providing zoning and other services, particularly for unlicensed spectrum. All these assessments are premised on the success of making additional spectrum as the key resource available. They are also premised on the absence of a killer technology like P2P FTTH that potentially dominates all other technologies. What determines the endgame in telecommunications regulation? Although technical and market developments will dominantly shape the regulatory efficiency frontier, institutional and political economy factors have an additional and mostly slowing effect on policy changes. (JEL: L43; L86; L96; L98.

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