Abstract-Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) are emerging as a principal mechanism for managing the sharing of radio spectrum. The design of the SAS depends on the specification of spectrum property rights and the governance system by which those rights are enforced. Current perspectives on SAS design have been too limited, focusing narrowly on the technical components without adequate consideration of socio-technical factors that will impact the likely success of any SAS design.In this paper, we apply the social science literature on the management of common pool resources (CPR) to the design challenge for the SAS. Heretofore, too much of the discussion has focused on an overly simplistic characterization of the spectrum rights design space as a dichotomous choice between licensed v. unlicensed, markets v. government, and exclusive v. open. The CPR framework forces consideration of a wider class of design options, positioning the specifications of spectrum property rights more appropriately along a multi-dimensional continuum of rights bundles. The CPR framework highlights the importance of considering formal and informal, multi-layered institutional and market-based interactions among SAS stakeholders when designing a resource management system. We will explain how this leads one to view the SAS as a polycentric governance system (using the terminology in the CPR literature). By examining the economic and social context of spectrum sharing, we assert that these emerging systems must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to various forms of resource governance, which refers to the process by which rights are distributed among stakeholders, how those rights are enforced, and how the resource is managed. We illustrate how the insights from the CPR literature might be implemented in a prototype SAS architecture.

Abstract-Sharing of radio spectrum requires a careful and nuanced understanding of the rights of incumbents and spectrum entrants. In addition, the dynamics of stakeholders can be understood by examining how various rights are arranged (and rearranged) among them. Importantly, understanding the rights and their distribution is the predicate to developing rational and useful enforcement approaches.In this paper, we show that spectrum sharing involves a rearrangement of the rights associated with radio spectrum among stakeholders. We show how this rearrangement of rights implies the definition of new bundles of rights, appropriate to each particular sharing scenario. We discover these rights -and their (re)arrangement) -by examining several cases of spectrum use. We begin with the rights associated with exclusive use and proceed to consider rights arrangement in commons and different spectrum sharing configurations. Further, in the case of commons, we explicitly examine how governance of commons can affect the rights distribution in spectrum. In each case, the bundles of rights associated with each stakeholder changes.New bundles of rights have consequences, not only on the behavior of spectrum users but also on the enforcement process. Our examination of the bundles of rights shows that each rearrangement results in different approaches to enforcement. We demonstrate this by revisiting enforcement in the cases we examine.

Abstract-Secondary markets for spectrum trading have been considered an important solution for generating spectrum opportunities in an environment where scarcity is the rule. Nonetheless, an important factor when envisioning a successful spectrum trading environment is to consider how comparable an available frequency is to the frequency an spectrum user prefers. With this aim, we consider the fungibility scores previously determined in [1] in order to explore further parameters that can influence this quantification of the level of fungibility. Further, we merge these fungibility calculations with an existing spectrum trading model, SPECTRAD [2], seeking to determine the actual impact of the limitations of spectrum fungibility in the market viability.

Studies of blockchain governance can be divided into analyses of the governance of blockchains (such as rules and power dynamics within a given network) and governance by blockchains (such as how blockchains can be implemented to improve self-governance of community-based peer production networks). Less emphasis has been placed on applications of distributed ledgers to public sector governance. Our review clarifies that the decentralization and distributive features that enable blockchains to link up loosely connected private organizations and public agencies to improve efficiency and transparency of government transactions. However, most blockchain applications lack clear advantages over the conventional digital recording of information. In addition, our review highlights that blockchain applications in public sector governance are potentially vast, though in most instances, the existing applications have not extended much beyond limited-scale pilots. We conclude with a call for the construction of indexes of public sector implementations of blockchains, as none yet exist, as well as for additional research to understand why governments have not deployed blockchains more widely.

The exploitation of radio-electric spectrum bands for wireless transmission purposes has some features of the commons: it is subject to congestion and conflict without rules governing its use. The Coasean approach is to assign private property rights to overcome the tragedy of the spectrum commons. The process of assigning these rights is still centralized, with governments assigning property rights through agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the USA. We consider the possibility of self-governance of the spectrum. We use insights from the study of common pool resources governance to analyze the emergence of property rights to spectrum in a ‘government-less’ environment in which norms, rules, and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of the repeated interactions among participants in the network. Our case study considers the spectrum-sharing arrangement in the 1,695–1,710 MHz band. Using agent-based modeling (ABM), we show that self-governance of the spectrum can work and under what conditions it is likely to improve the efficiency of the allocation of property rights.

Wireless network virtualization is emerging as a potential game-changer for fifth-generation wireless networks. Virtualization of network resources (e.g., infrastructure and spectrum) brings several advantages. One key advantage is that various network operators can robustly share their virtualized network resources to extend coverage, increase capacity, and reduce costs. However, inherent features of wireless communications, e.g., the uncertainty in user equipment locations and channel conditions, impose significant challenges on virtualization and sharing of the network resources. In this context, we propose a novel three-layered virtualization framework, based on a matching game model and stochastic resource allocation. Our proposed architecture aims at guaranteeing user satisfaction and maximizing the revenue for operators, with reasonable computational complexity, and affordable network overhead.

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