A Middle Class Response to Disaster

Abstract

Specific Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) policies and procedures impacted vulnerable populations both positively and negatively after Hurricane Andrew. Findings from 130 structured interviews with a randomized sample of victims sug-gest that in many cases FEMA policies were unclear, poorly explained, too rigid, and required a high level of middle-class fmancial management skills to comply w i t h eligibility requirements. These problems resulted in multi-generational families living together in one dwelling, and applicants from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds obtaining fewer services than they were entitled to receive. The outcome of the legal action (in which this study was used as evidence) that resulted in reparations to 21,000 Hurricane Andrew applicants and changes made in FEMA policies and procedures are discussed. fAnicle copies ovoiloble for a fee fmm The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678. E-mail address: ge~info@howorth.com]Humcane Andrew was one of Florida's worst and the most expensive hunicane ever. Andrew hit South Florida on August 24, 1992. With sustained winds of over I50 mph, this humcane caused 40 deaths, seriously damaged more than 75,000 homes, and resulted in $30 billion in damages. More than a million people were without electricity, telephone, and water. The temperatures were in the mid 90's during the day and mid 80's at night (Clifford, Leen, & Doig, 1992).Often, after the shock of a catastrophic natural or human made disaster,

The role of social workers in disasters

“…In the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) is such an agency. However, Cherry and Cherry (1997) found that this agency was seen as rigid and 'adjusting itself to the middle-class population'. People from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds obtained fewer services than they were entitled to receive, perhaps because they failed to share their needs with others.…”

Organisation and delivery of social services in extreme events: Lessons from social work research on natural disasters

“…They are not designed to 'respond to sudden changes in their service population' (Kulkarni et al, 2008: 419). If on offer, governmental social services usually provide targeted social services limited to specific community members (as opposed to universal provision); they are commonly delivered through cumbersome systems built to identify fraud prevention, rather than to ensure flexibility and wide-ranging delivery (Cherry and Cherry, 1997). Notwithstanding, as Smith (2012) highlights, people expect an immediate response from the government following a natural disaster, preferably from its highest level and implemented locally.…”

“…A key concern highlighted throughout the literature is the degree of flexibility and responsiveness that services have at grass-roots level when responding to a disaster. Several studies suggest that governmental services are too bureaucratised to allow the flexibility and scope of delivery necessary to respond to a disaster (Cain and Barthelemy, 2008;Cherry and Cherry, 1997;Kulkarni et al, 2008;Manning and Kushma, 2016;Sherraden and Fox, 1997). They are not designed to 'respond to sudden changes in their service population' (Kulkarni et al, 2008: 419).…”

“…In light of such findings, some researchers stress the need for more strategic disaster planning specifically for traditional service users, such as older people (Sanders et al, 2004), for whom procedures and provisions tend to diminish or disappear after a disaster (Cherry and Cherry, 1997). This becomes all the more significant since studies suggest that traditional service users (older people, children, disabled people, people living on a low income, minorities and other marginalised groups) tend to be disproportionately affected by disasters when compared to the general population (Zakour, 1997).…”

“…Emergency services are also reported to arrive more quickly to affluent areas (Cherry and Cherry, 1997;Moore et al, 2004). Services offered are also likely to lack consideration for cultural differences and needs (Cherry and Cherry, 1997) or to acknowledge that Black evacuees, for example, are likely to have distinctive cultural beliefs and experiences of oppression (Kulkarni et al, 2008). Researchers stress that support provision during and after a disaster needs to reflect the diversity of the population.…”