A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting

Levitt, Justin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1647221

Cited by 21 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 4 publications

(4 reference statements)

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“…7 A growing number of states employ a non-traditional approach, authorizing some form of commission to draw congressional district lines. According to Levitt (2010), there are four commission types-back-up commission, politician commission, advisory board, and independent commission. While these bodies vary substantially in their composition and political independence, we have chosen not to complicate the analysis by creating separate variables for each of the four commission approaches; our emphasis on judicial redistricting led us instead to collapse them into a single ''commission '' category.…”

Section: Redistricting Methods (Independent Variables)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While these bodies vary substantially in their composition and political independence, we have chosen not to complicate the analysis by creating separate variables for each of the four commission approaches; our emphasis on judicial redistricting led us instead to collapse them into a single ''commission '' category. 8 In the 2000 apportionment cycle, eleven states used some form of commission as their baseline redistricting approach (Levitt 2010). 9 Once we determined each state's baseline approach to redistricting, we gathered information about judicial involvement in congressional redistricting in the 2000 apportionment period.…”

Section: Redistricting Methods (Independent Variables)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We supplement these data with information on partisan control of state government institutions obtained from PoliData for the years 2000-2008 3 and from the National Council on State Legislatures for the 2010 election. 4 We rely on Levitt (2010) for data on state approaches to congressional redistricting, 1 Lloyd examined state-level redistricting cases from 1964 to 1983, and McKenzie focused on federal district court cases involving state legislative and congressional redistricting plans in the 1982-2007 period. 2 There are many empirical studies of judicial behavior examining the role of ideology (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002) and partisan affiliation (e.g., Sunstein, Schadke, Ellman, and Sawicki 2006) in the legal policy choices that judges make.…”

Section: Modeling the Impact Of Judicial Redistrictingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The large number of court challenges routinely brought against proposed legislative maps is another clear sign of dissatisfaction with redistricting processes and results. For example, in the 2000 reapportionment cycle, there were court challenges in 21 of the 43 states with more than one congressional district (Levitt 2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gerrymandering from the Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting

Cottrill¹,

Peretti²

2013

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy

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Widespread public mistrust of legislative redistricting begs the question: Can (presumably) neutral and independent courts produce more competitive districts that preserve the integrity of the democratic process? The regime politics perspective suggests not, portraying courts as partisan collaborators whose rulings help their regime allies in the other branches. Conversely, recent congressional elections research suggests that non-legislative approaches to redistricting (such as independent commissions) encourage experienced candidates to mount serious electoral challenges to incumbents. We extend this literature by focusing on the impact of judicial participation in the redistricting process. Using data for the 2000 apportionment cycle, we test whether judicial redistricting enhances the competitiveness of congressional elections, as some studies suggest, or if it instead serves to promote the interests of the party with which the judge is affiliated, as the regime politics literature would lead us to believe. Our findings suggest that judicial redistricting does enhance competition in congressional elections, but we fail to find evidence that it confers any partisan advantage.

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Section: Redistricting Methods (Independent Variables)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Redistricting Methods (Independent Variables)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modeling the Impact Of Judicial Redistrictingmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Gerrymandering from the Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting

Cottrill¹,

Peretti²

2013

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy

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“…It is important to note that I am here providing summary descriptions; each state adds its own specific twist to the process. For more information, I recommend the online Citizen's Guide to Redistricting (Levitt 2008) or the electronic state summaries provided by the National Conference of Legislatures (http://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/redist/redprof2010/ profiles2010.htm) or the Public Mapping Project (http:// www.publicmapping.org/), which link directly to state constitutional and statutory citations.…”

Section: Redistricting Controlsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The 2010 Midterm Elections: Signs and Portents for the Decennial Redistricting

McDonald

2011

APSC

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The 2010 midterm elections are consequential not only in terms of the candidates who were elected to office, but also in terms of the government policies that they will enact. High on the list of important policies is the decennial practice of drawing new redistricting plans for legislative offices. A new census reveals population shifts that will result in a reallocation of congressional seats among the states through apportionment and—following U.S. Supreme Court rulings in the 1960s—a re-balancing of congressional and state legislative district populations within states that aims to give fast-growing areas more representation and slow-growing areas less. Of course, much more than an innocuous administrative adjustment occurs during the process of redistricting. The individuals who draw districts are keenly aware that district lines may affect the fortunes of incumbents, political parties, and minority voters' candidates of choice.

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