Gerrymandering from the Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting

Abstract

Widespread public mistrust of legislative redistricting begs the question: Can (presumably) neutral and independent courts produce more competitive districts that preserve the integrity of the democratic process? The regime politics perspective suggests not, portraying courts as partisan collaborators whose rulings help their regime allies in the other branches. Conversely, recent congressional elections research suggests that non-legislative approaches to redistricting (such as independent commissions) encourage experienced candidates to mount serious electoral challenges to incumbents. We extend this literature by focusing on the impact of judicial participation in the redistricting process. Using data for the 2000 apportionment cycle, we test whether judicial redistricting enhances the competitiveness of congressional elections, as some studies suggest, or if it instead serves to promote the interests of the party with which the judge is affiliated, as the regime politics literature would lead us to believe. Our findings suggest that judicial redistricting does enhance competition in congressional elections, but we fail to find evidence that it confers any partisan advantage.

The Mask of Neutrality: Judicial Partisan Calculation and Legislative Redistricting

“…Further, I find that since judges may rightly be seen as actors in or attendant to a political regime and as doing the bidding of their preferred partisan coalitions, judges drawing districts appear to advance the electoral interests of their copartisan candidates for Congress (consistent with the extant literature on judicial partisanship and election litigation [e.g., Lloyd ; Kopko ; Peretti ]). Contrary to previous studies finding no effect of judicial partisanship on electoral outcomes (Cottrill and Peretti ) or finding partisan behavioral effects when examining judicial decisions about individual instances of redistricting on their own without comparing the electoral outcomes of those decisions with the outcomes following legislative or commission redistricting (McKenzie ), I demonstrate that some judges draw legislative districts that provide significant electoral rewards to copartisan congressional candidates. While courts may in fact draw more electorally competitive districts than legislatures, court‐drawn electoral competition seems to have its roots in judges’ partisan calculations.…”

“…To my knowledge, no scholar has examined whether the margin of victory in congressional elections is associated with judicial redistricting over so long a time period, nor has any scholar theorized that judicial partisan calculation of the sort I describe—in which judges deliberately target districts held by contrapartisans for increased electoral competition—leads to systematically different outcomes in legislative elections. I find that judicial redistricting plans have resulted in more competitive elections than plans drawn by state legislatures and non‐independent commissions (consistent with Cottrill and Peretti and Carson, Crespin, and Williamson ). Further, I find that since judges may rightly be seen as actors in or attendant to a political regime and as doing the bidding of their preferred partisan coalitions, judges drawing districts appear to advance the electoral interests of their copartisan candidates for Congress (consistent with the extant literature on judicial partisanship and election litigation [e.g., Lloyd ; Kopko ; Peretti ]).…”

“…Studies have also suggested that independent commissions and courts should consider nonpartisan considerations that are intended to enhance electoral competition such as district compactness, responsiveness, and accountability (Butler and Cain 1992;Hirsch 2003). Other research has shown that districts shaped by commissions and courts (i.e., through nonlegislative redistricting) experience more competitive elections than those that undergo redistricting conducted by partisan state legislatures (Carson and Crespin 2004;Grose 2011;Cottrill 2012;Cottrill and Peretti 2013;Lindgren and Southwell 2013;Carson, Crespin, and Williamson 2014). No empirical relationship has been demonstrated between the partisanship of judges and electoral rewards for those judges' copartisans in congressional elections (at least from 2002 to 2010) (Cottrill and Peretti 2013), but some isolated , 1982-2012. nonpartisan plans commissioned by judges have seemed to reflect demonstrable copartisan bias (Kousser 1996).…”

Independent Redistricting Commissions and Electoral Competition in the US House of Representatives

“…In still other cases, the courts may select among competing plans put forth by a deadlocked legislature. Several studies (Cottrill & Peretti, 2013;Carson, Crespin, & Williamson, 2014) find that judicial redistricting produces greater competition in congressional elections than legislative redistricting.…”