Growing concern over gerrymandering has led some states to transfer redistricting responsibility from legislatures to commissions, boards, or other less overtly partisan bodies. These transfers in redistricting responsibility offer scholars an opportunity to study the impact of redistricting processes on elections. This study, focusing on congressional elections for the years 1982-2008, suggests that nonlegislative methods of redistricting encouraged strong, well-financed challengers to step forward, and decreased the likelihood that incumbents would run unopposed. The data, however, do not show that non-legislative redistricting either reduced the typical margins of incumbents' victories or increased the likelihood that incumbents would lose. In fact, the data sometimes run contrary to expectations. This raises questions about the common contention (especially by reformers) that nonlegislative approaches (NLA) will promote turnover of elected officials. The benefits of non-legislative redistricting depend both on the types of outcomes that are desired, and on the specific NLA that is adopted. Polity (2012) 44, 32-50.
Widespread public mistrust of legislative redistricting begs the question: Can (presumably) neutral and independent courts produce more competitive districts that preserve the integrity of the democratic process? The regime politics perspective suggests not, portraying courts as partisan collaborators whose rulings help their regime allies in the other branches. Conversely, recent congressional elections research suggests that non-legislative approaches to redistricting (such as independent commissions) encourage experienced candidates to mount serious electoral challenges to incumbents. We extend this literature by focusing on the impact of judicial participation in the redistricting process. Using data for the 2000 apportionment cycle, we test whether judicial redistricting enhances the competitiveness of congressional elections, as some studies suggest, or if it instead serves to promote the interests of the party with which the judge is affiliated, as the regime politics literature would lead us to believe. Our findings suggest that judicial redistricting does enhance competition in congressional elections, but we fail to find evidence that it confers any partisan advantage.
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