2009
DOI: 10.1590/s1678-69712009000600006
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Estrutura de capital e janelas de oportunidade: testes no mercado brasileiro

Abstract: Este estudo testa a teoria das janelas de oportunidade (EMTT) para o mercado acionário brasileiro. Este texto é uma adaptação do artigo de Baker e Wurgler (2002) que testaram com sucesso essa teoria para o mercado acionário americano. A teoria não foi comprovada no mercado brasileiro. A alavancagem diminuiu no primeiro ano após as ofertas públicas iniciais (IPO), mas cresceu novamente sem apresentar a persistência necessária para corroborar a teoria.

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Cited by 11 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…However, the findings regarding this phenomenon are contradictory or mixed. Mendes, Basso and Kayo (2009), and Padilha and Silva (2016) did not find significant effects of market timing on Brazilian companies' capital structure.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
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“…However, the findings regarding this phenomenon are contradictory or mixed. Mendes, Basso and Kayo (2009), and Padilha and Silva (2016) did not find significant effects of market timing on Brazilian companies' capital structure.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…On the other hand, Mendes et al(2009) adapted the article by Baker and Wurgler (2002) for the Brazilian market. The authors used data from Brazilian non-financial companies that carried out IPO during the period from 1996 to 2002.…”
Section: Evidence Of Market Timing In Brazilmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Debt utilization is key to the emergence of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Ross;Westerfield;Jaffe, 2002). Thus, because of such conflicts, Mendes et al (2009) show that the agency theory can be understood as the costs that come from the purpose of resolution of these conflicts, since managers and shareholders intervene in defense of their own interests. Grinblatt and Titmman (2005) elucidate that high company debt may be more favorable for shareholders as it would limit managers to adopt effective measures in personal terms and to expand the company more rapidly than advisable.…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to this theory, the optimal debt is defined by minimizing the total agency cost (Mendes et al, 2009).…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%