A influência da estrutura de propriedade e controle sobre o valor de mercado corporativo no Brasil

Abstract

The Brazilian model of corporate governance is characterized by a highly concentrated ownership structure, which usually culminates in an overlap between ownership and management. According to the literature, the accumulation of shares by the controller(s) can affect corporate performance due to both the alignment (or incentive) effect and the entrenchment effect. At first, the presence of large shareholders is associated with benefits for an organization because it increases the effectiveness of management monitoring. However, very high levels of ownership concentration can allow controllers to dominate the corporation's decision-making process, which could result in the expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders. The relevance of the ownership structure as an internal mechanism of corporate governance motivates the present study. This article aims to test whether ownership and control concentration influences corporate market value. An unbalanced panel was used for the period from 2001 to 2010, composed of 237 Brazilian non-financial publicly traded companies, totaling 1,199 observations. Dynamic regression models were used, estimated by the System Generalized Method of Moments (Sys-GMM), to mitigate possible sources of endogeneity, such as the omission of variables, the feedback effect, and the simultaneity. A quadratic relationship was found between cash flow rights of the largest shareholder and firm market value. Moreover, the results indicate that the corrected market value of the total shares held by the largest shareholder captured the incentive effect, while voting rights concentration captured the entrenchment effect.

Concentração de propriedade e desempenho: um estudo nas empresas brasileiras de capital aberto do setor de energia elétrica

“…LOGAT was used as a control variable, displaying a negative sign, corroborating the results of Gugler et al (2008) and Caixe & Krauter (2013), who state that a company's size impacts negatively in its market value, pointing out that large corporations are subject to greater agency problems and, consequently, higher monitoring costs, which reduce their performance. As for Net Profit, the positive sign was expected, given that an increase in it points out, as a first indicative, a maximization of the company's results.…”

“…The choice of considering only ordinary stocks is due to the fact that the Brazilian companies raise funds on the stock market, in general, through the emission of shares that do not grant voting rights to its owners, and even though the concentration of ownership positively influences the market value since there is a more efficient managing monitoring of the controlling shareholder, according to a study conducted by Caixe & Krauter (2013). In this sense, it is expected for the performance of the companies with ordinary actions in the hands of the greatest shareholder to be better than those which have more than one shareholder with ordinary shares.…”

“…The larger the company, the larger the agency problems and the monitoring costs, which reduces their market value. According to Caixe & Krauter (2013), in this manner the net profit will also be affected, since it is a determinant variable for the trade-off between selling, buying or keeping shares.…”

O Impacto da Governança Corporativa: Conselho de Administração, Estrutura de Propriedade e Controle e as Informações Socioambientais nas Companhias Abertas

“…Nesse contexto, um dos intuitos da Governança Corporativa é diminuir a assimetria da informação, reduzindo os conflitos de agência, em que, a composição do conselho de administração, a estrutura de propriedade e controle, a transparência (Disclosure), bem como a proteção aos acionistas minoritários são elementos fundamentais (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010;L. F. Correia, Amaral, & Luvet., 2011;Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013;Caixe & Krauter, 2013 envolvidos na empresa chegarem a um consenso na tomada de decisões (L. F. Correia, et al, 2011).…”

Efeitos da estrutura de propriedade na decisão de fusões e aquisições

“…A importância desse trabalho reflete na realidade brasileira onde, de acordo com Caixe e Krauter (2013), o modelo de governança corporativa é caracterizado por elevada concentração na sua estrutura societária e que, em geral, culmina na sobreposição da propriedade e da administração das companhias. Ademais, as empresas brasileiras tendem a se agruparem em grupos econômicos piramidais (LAZZARINI, 2011), permeadas por traços de informalidade, cordialidade e protecionismo (TANURE e CANÇADO, 2005).…”