Shareholding Interest in Companies Listed on B3 in 2018: A Study of Networks

Abstract

The shareholding structure of large companies interferes with market competition, as well as the financial stability thereof. Some international studies have analyzed the control network of companies in their corresponding countries, others have broadened such vision to transnational companies, conducting a world level analysis, with both aiming to describe the willingness of the main shareholders regarding the network structure. Thus, the challenge herein is to elaborate and analyze the network of shareholding in companies listed on B3 in 2018. This paper will be descriptive research that uses Network Analysis of data obtained from Economatica software. As a result, we find a network with a giant component comprised of 726 players and a shareholders' network of low density, high modularity and with main players of high influence. The results contribute to understanding the current structure of the Brazilian stock market share and are expected to encourage new researches on the Brazilian financial market.

Distribuição De Dividendos E Valor De Empresas Listadas Na B3

“…A análise das medianas de q dos grupos revela que o valor das empresas brasileiras é inferior ao valor q das empresas americanas e das empresas dos demais países do estudo de Kim et al (2016). Parece razoável inferir que particularidades do mercado brasileiro como a presença do governo (regulador de mercado) como acionista em empresas significativas (Carvalho & Ribeiro, 2019), alta concentração de ações em posse do majoritário (Vancin & Procianoy, 2016), baixa liquidez de títulos (Nogueira et al, 2021) e sua natureza especulativa de negociação, possam ser motivadores para os baixos índices de valor observados.…”

The effect of social ties between the CEO and board of directors and fiscal council's members on earnings management

“…The separation between ownership and control resulting from the emergence of joint-stock companies brought with it the emergence of agency problems, such as conflict of interest, a divergence in the preference of risks between the actors involved, and the problem of information asymmetry (Arrow, 1985;Bearle and Means, 1984;Eisenhardt, 1989;Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Smith, 1776;Williamson, 1985). Differently from markets with capital dispersion, where the focus is on the problems between principal vs agent, in markets in which capital concentration occurs, as is the case in Brazil, the problems arising from the principal vs principal relationship, that is, between majority and minority shareholders, are more relevant (Carvalho and Ribeiro, 2019;Dalm acio and Corrar, 2007). In this context, the expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders is more significant since the controlling shareholders do not want to risk losing the protection of invested capital or the control of the organization (C espedes et al, 2010;La Porta et al, 1999;Vieira and Martins, 2018).…”