Abstract:Voluntary contribution mechanism to public goods is one of the traditional types of economic experiments. The article summarizes the results of series of experiments that have been conducted with several groups of Czech university students. Using the threshold mechanism the impact of several factors (experience, communication and the form of experiment) on voluntary contribution to public goods is tested. The results confi rm, to a great extent, fi ndings published by foreign studies. The results show that Czech students also do not behave consistently with the traditional economic public goods model, i.e. they cooperate voluntarily in situations that favour free riding. Threshold is a traditional part of (mostly American) charitable collections and can be regarded as one of the most successful modifi cations of the voluntary contribution mechanism to public good. Experiments involving Czech students indicate that such technique can be successful even in Czech non-profi t sector.
This paper presents results of an experiment with Czech (and Slovak) University students replicating study of Denant-Boèmont, Masclet and Noussair (2007). The experiment focuses on impacts of different punishment opportunities in public goods game. The original experiment was executed in the so-called partner matching (where subjects interacted with the same co-players during the whole session). The author’s aim was to enrich and complete the data with results obtained in stranger matching (where composition of groups changed randomly before each round of a session). The author argues that such extension is of relevance because real human interactions are often the strangers ones, that is, people are obliged to interact with unknown counterparts.The results show that, in the case of stranger interactions, subjects are considerably less willing to cooperate and to engage in punishment of free riders. On the other hand, we can observe the same reactions in response to diverse opportunities to sanction. Both in cases of partners and strangers, the possibility to avenge sanctions reduces the willingness to cooperate while opportunity of sanction enforcement has an inverse effect. This finding endorses the conclusions of original experiment.
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