Dyadic interactions often involve a dynamic process of mutual reciprocity; to steer a series of exchanges towards a desired outcome, both interactants must adapt their own behaviour according to that of their interaction partner. Understanding the brain processes behind such bidirectional reciprocity is therefore central to social neuroscience, but this requires measurement of both individuals’ brains during real-world exchanges. We achieved this by performing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) on pairs of male individuals simultaneously while they interacted in a modified iterated Ultimatum Game (iUG). In this modification, both players could express their intent and maximise their own monetary gain by reciprocating their partner’s behaviour – they could promote generosity through cooperation and/or discourage unfair play with retaliation. By developing a novel model of reciprocity adapted from behavioural economics, we then show that each player’s choices can be predicted accurately by estimating expected utility (EU) not only in terms of immediate payoff, but also as a reaction to their opponent’s prior behaviour. Finally, for the first time we reveal that brain signals implicated in social decision making are modulated by these estimates of EU, and become correlated more strongly between interacting players who reciprocate one another.

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Dyadic interactions often involve a dynamic process of mutual reciprocity; to steer a series of exchanges towards a desired outcome, both interactants must adapt their own behaviour according to that of their interaction partner. Understanding the brain processes behind such bidirectional reciprocity is therefore central to social neuroscience, but this requires measurement of both individuals’ brains during real-world exchanges. We achieved this by performing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) on pairs of male individuals simultaneously while they interacted in a modified iterated Ultimatum Game (iUG). In this modification, both players could express their intent and maximise their own monetary gain by reciprocating their partner’s behaviour – they could promote generosity through cooperation and/or discourage unfair play with retaliation. By developing a novel model of reciprocity adapted from behavioural economics, we then show that each player’s choices can be predicted accurately by estimating expected utility (EU) not only in terms of immediate payoff, but also as a reaction to their opponent’s prior behaviour. Finally, for the first time we reveal that brain signals implicated in social decision making are modulated by these estimates of EU, and become correlated more strongly between interacting players who reciprocate one another.

Choosing between rented housing and homeownership, the so called housing tenure choice, is a key decision made by each household. Therefore housing economists often seek an answer to the question which factors have an impact on this decision. The paper investigates potential tenure choice determinants using probit regression model based on the sample data. Results of the analysis, making use of the investigation of EU-SILC in the CR, showed that tenure choice is affected by the factors similar to those in other countries -household income, marital status of the household head and household size (persons per household). By contrast, the influence of other demographic characteristics, such as gender and age of head of the household has not been confirmed. The econometric model has also made it possible to evaluate potential impact of these factors on housing related expenses of households. In addition to the logical influence of household income, tenure choice decisions are significantly influenced by household size and residence in Prague, particularly in the rented housing sector.

During social interactions, decision‐making involves mutual reciprocity—each individual's choices are simultaneously a consequence of, and antecedent to those of their interaction partner. Neuroeconomic research has begun to unveil the brain networks underpinning social decision‐making, but we know little about the patterns of neural connectivity within them that give rise to reciprocal choices. To investigate this, the present study measured the behaviour and brain function of pairs of individuals (N = 66) whilst they played multiple rounds of economic exchange comprising an iterated ultimatum game. During these exchanges, both players could attempt to maximise their overall monetary gain by reciprocating their opponent's prior behaviour—they could promote generosity by rewarding it, and/or discourage unfair play through retaliation. By adapting a model of reciprocity from experimental economics, we show that players' choices on each exchange are captured accurately by estimating their expected utility (EU) as a reciprocal reaction to their opponent's prior behaviour. We then demonstrate neural responses that map onto these reciprocal choices in two brain regions implicated in social decision‐making: right anterior insula (AI) and anterior/anterior‐mid cingulate cortex (aMCC). Finally, with behavioural Dynamic Causal Modelling, we identified player‐specific patterns of effective connectivity between these brain regions with which we estimated each player's choices with over 70% accuracy; namely, bidirectional connections between AI and aMCC that are modulated differentially by estimates of EU from our reciprocity model. This input‐state‐output modelling procedure therefore reveals systematic brain–behaviour relationships associated with the reciprocal choices characterising interactive social decision‐making.

Abstract:Voluntary contribution mechanism to public goods is one of the traditional types of economic experiments. The article summarizes the results of series of experiments that have been conducted with several groups of Czech university students. Using the threshold mechanism the impact of several factors (experience, communication and the form of experiment) on voluntary contribution to public goods is tested. The results confi rm, to a great extent, fi ndings published by foreign studies. The results show that Czech students also do not behave consistently with the traditional economic public goods model, i.e. they cooperate voluntarily in situations that favour free riding. Threshold is a traditional part of (mostly American) charitable collections and can be regarded as one of the most successful modifi cations of the voluntary contribution mechanism to public good. Experiments involving Czech students indicate that such technique can be successful even in Czech non-profi t sector.

We study the impact of media bias on tax compliance. Through a framed laboratory experiment, we assess how the exposure to biased news about government action affects compliance in a repeated taxation game. Subjects treated with positive news are significantly more compliant than the control group. The exposure to negative news, instead, does not prompt any significant reaction in respect to the neutral condition, suggesting that participants perceive the media negativity bias in the selection and tonality of news as the norm rather than the exception. Overall, our results suggest that biased news act as a constant source of psychological priming and play a vital role in taxpayers' compliance decisions.

Jit ka Še ne klo vá, Jihomoravské centrum pro mezinárodní mobilitu, z. s. p. o., Brno, Jiøí Špa lek, Eko no mic ko-správ ní fa kul ta, Ma sa ry ko va un ver zi ta, Brno ÚvodJed ním ze zá klad ních pøed po kla dù ne o kla sic kých mi k ro e ko no mic kých mo de lù je exis ten ce ra ci o nál ní ho jed not liv ce, jehož vý sost ným zá jmem je ma xi ma li za ce vlastní ho užitku. Tak to po jí ma ný ra ci o nál ní je di nec je tedy so bec ky ori en to ván na uspo kojo vá ní vlast ních po tøeb a do sa ho vá ní co nej vyš ší užit ko vé hla di ny za da ných okol nos tí. 1Tak to strikt nì vy me ze ná pøed sta va o lid ském cho vá ní, kte rá v ji ných spo le èen -ských vì dách není ob vyk lá, 2 po cho pi tel nì vede k otáz ce o své re le van ci. Cho va jí se lidé sku teè nì podle eko no mic kých mo de lù? Nebo jsou eko no mic ké mo de ly lid ské ho cho vá ní re a li tì vzdá le ny a lidé se ve sku teè nos ti roz ho du jí na základì jiných než sobeckých pohnutek?V tom to pøí pa dì je otáz kou, zda nejsou tyto -eko no my vy tvo øe né -mo de ly spí še po pi sem cho vá ní sa mot ných eko no mù. Od li šu jí se tedy eko no mo vé od ostat ních tím, že jsou na dá ni vyš ší mí rou so bec ké ho cho vá ní? Je od eko no mù možno oèe ká vat men ší míru spo lu prá ce v si tu a cích spo lu prá ci vyžadu jí cích a mùže být ekonom vnímán jako synonymum pro èerného pasažéra?Zmí nì né otáz ky se pro nás sta ly ná mì tem k pro ve de ní dvou em pi ric kých tes tù. S využitím me tod ex pe ri men tál ní eko no mie jsme se po ku si li zmì øit míru spo lu prá ce jedin cù v mo de lo vých eko no mic kých si tu a cích, pøi èemž zís ka né hod no ty jsme po rov na li pro rùzné skupiny osob (vèetnì ekonomù).Vý cho zím da to vým sou bo rem jsou vý sled ky ex pe ri men tù pro ve de ných mezi studen ty rùz ných fa kult (zejmé na) Ma sa ry ko vy uni ver zi ty. Stu den ti byli vy bí rá ni na zá kladì na bíd ky k dob ro vol né spo lu prá ci a mo ti vo vá ni drob nou fi nanè ní od mì nou (zá vis lou na je jich úspìš nos ti pøi uve de ných ex pe ri men tech). 2 Sociologové èi politologové vycházejí z pøedpokladu, že kooperativní chování je pøirozeným dùsledkem postupného ustanovování spoleèenských norem a zvyklostí. Kagel, Roth (1995), s. 121. 3 Jak uvádíme dále, finanèní motivace je pro úspìch experimentu klíèová. Viz také napø. Friedman, Cassar (2004). l PO LI TIC KÁ EKO NO MIE, 1, 20091. Vý cho dis ka ex pe ri men tù Ex pe ri men tál ní eko no mie a její vý vojExperimentální ekonomie je v našich podmínkách témìø neznámá disciplína. Ve struènosti lze øíci, že se snaží formou experimentù, her a pokusù objevovat, rozvíjet, dotváøet, ovìøovat èi vyvracet stávající ekonomické teorie. Zároveò pøedstavuje neotøelý zpùsob výuky ekonomie. První èlánek, který vešel v povìdomí, pochází z roku 1931. Jeho autor, L. L. Thurstone (1931), se zamìøil na problém experimentálního urèení indiferenèních køivek. Aèkoli byl jím prezentovaný zpùsob zkoumání kritizován W. Allenem Wallisem a Miltonem Friedmanem (roku 1942), 4 ekonomické experimenty se postupnì stávaly stále èast...