Threshold Effectiveness in Contributing to the Public Goods: Experiments Involving Czech Students

Špalek, Jiří; Berná, Zuzana

doi:10.18267/j.pep.399

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Nemec (1998) emphasized the economic and social specifics of transitive economics countries relative to individual behavior. The previous Czech results (see Šeneklová & Špalek, 2009;or Špalek & Berná, 2011or Špalek & Berná, , 2012, however, demonstrated no important disparities between the Czech and foreign results related to the voluntary contribution mechanism.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 78%

Different Matching in Public Goods Experiments with Punishment Opportunity

Berná¹

2013

RES

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This paper presents results of an experiment with Czech (and Slovak) University students replicating study of Denant-Boèmont, Masclet and Noussair (2007). The experiment focuses on impacts of different punishment opportunities in public goods game. The original experiment was executed in the so-called partner matching (where subjects interacted with the same co-players during the whole session). The author’s aim was to enrich and complete the data with results obtained in stranger matching (where composition of groups changed randomly before each round of a session). The author argues that such extension is of relevance because real human interactions are often the strangers ones, that is, people are obliged to interact with unknown counterparts.The results show that, in the case of stranger interactions, subjects are considerably less willing to cooperate and to engage in punishment of free riders. On the other hand, we can observe the same reactions in response to diverse opportunities to sanction. Both in cases of partners and strangers, the possibility to avenge sanctions reduces the willingness to cooperate while opportunity of sanction enforcement has an inverse effect. This finding endorses the conclusions of original experiment.

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Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 78%

Different Matching in Public Goods Experiments with Punishment Opportunity

Berná¹

2013

RES

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“…Several theoretical models demonstrate that the assurance problem is mitigated by a credible money-back guarantee that applies if the threshold for the provision of the public good is not met (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Tabarrok, 1998). Experimental evidence from the laboratory (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999; Isaac et al , 1989; Marks and Croson, 1998; Rondeau et al , 1999; Špalek and Berná, 2011), as well as from the field (Rondeau et al , 2005; Rose et al , 2002), confirms that the introduction of refunds increases total contributions to a public good. In the past, the use of refunds for a large group of contributors was costly.…”

Section: The Assurance Problem Refunds and Rebatesmentioning

confidence: 84%

Private provision of public goods via crowdfunding

Hudík

Chovanculiak²

2017

Journal of Institutional Economics

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For various reasons, governments sometimes fail to provide public goods. Private provision of such goods might then be used if it succeeds in overcoming three main problems: high organization costs, the assurance problem, and the free-rider problem. We argue that technologies that enable crowdfunding – the method of funding projects by raising small amounts of money from a large number of people via the internet – have enabled these problems to be overcome more readily. Such technology has lowered organization costs and enabled the employment of more efficient mechanisms to reduce the assurance and free-rider problems. To illustrate these effects, we present two case studies of private provision of public goods via crowdfunding: police services in Rockridge in Oakland, California, and the Ukraine Army.

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“…2 Each of them could win up to 10 extra-credits (10 % of the sum needed to pass the subject). The motivation follows our former experience with (not only teaching) experiments (see Šeneklová, Špalek, 2009;Špalek, Berná, 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A simple in-class experiment on the efficient production of the pure public good touching the median voter theorem

Raguseo¹,

Klus²,

Špalek³

2013

Acta Univ. Agric. Silvic. Mendelianae Brun.

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RAGUSEO, D., ŠPALEK, J., KLUS, M.: A simple in-class experiment on the effi cient production of the pure public good touching the median voter theorem. Acta univ. agric. et silvic. Mendel. Brun., 2012, LX, No. 4, pp. 319-326 The paper show possibilities of introducing modern methods into public economy and fi nance teaching. We present in-class experiment which illustrates one of typical model from political economy -the median voter theorem. Students are endowed with cards that represent their preferences on diff erent levels of the public good production. They compare benefi t they can get from diff erent levels of public good (these levels represent three candidates) and then they vote for the most preferred level. This process continues for several rounds, with a new election taking place with a diff erent sample of students. The in-class experiment demonstrates that the simplicity of the median voter theorem, when there are more than two candidates, provides only an imprecise prediction of the collective choice. The methodology of the experiment is enriched by the statistical analysis of experimental results from experiment cartied out by the authors in Czech Republic and Slovakia. median voter, public choice, experiment, public good, game, free rider, effi ciency

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Threshold Effectiveness in Contributing to the Public Goods: Experiments Involving Czech Students

Cited by 6 publications

References 23 publications

Different Matching in Public Goods Experiments with Punishment Opportunity

Different Matching in Public Goods Experiments with Punishment Opportunity

Private provision of public goods via crowdfunding

A simple in-class experiment on the efficient production of the pure public good touching the median voter theorem

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