We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schemaconsistent actions and schema-inconsistent actions, and schema-consistent objects and schema-inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema-inconsistent items than for schema-consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema-inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema-consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema-inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item-specific information of schema-inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema-consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema-consistent action distracters than for schema-consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema-consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema-consistent action distracters.Key words: perception/thought/emotion/context questionnaire, recognition memory, remember/know judgment, schema.The concept of "schema" was introduced by Bartlett (1932) as an active organization of past experiences. In other words, a schema is the generic knowledge of particular scenes. When we experience an event, we access the relevant schema to comprehend the event. Hence, our memory is not a mere record of the experienced event, but the product of an interpretation under a schema (Alba & Hasher, 1983).How schemas affect recognition memory has received strong interest from many researchers (Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979;Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1980;Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001;Lampinen, Faries, Neuschatz, & Toglia, 2000;Nakamura, Graesser, Zimmerman, & Riha, 1985;Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, & Toglia, 2002;Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989). These researchers experimentally examined the effects of schemas on recognition memory using the following procedure. At first, schema-consistent targets and schema-inconsistent targets were presented to participants. Then, participants completed a recognition test, consisting of schema-consistent targets, schema-inconsistent targets, schema-consistent distracters, and *Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to: Ryoma Yamada, College of Humanities and Sciences, Nihon University, Sakurajosui, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 156-8550, Japan. (E-mail: ryom_cc@yahoo.co.jp) 1 We would like to express our gratitude to Yayoi Kawasaki and Masaya Mochizuki for helpful comments, and one companion for ...

No abstract

To determine the effects of presentation medium and social influence on the misinformation effect, two experiments using the misinformation paradigm were conducted. The misinformation was presented via a videotaped conversation between two confederates. Three target items were created. In Experiment 1, participants were exposed to misinformation via videotape, and showed a misinformation effect for one of three targets. In Experiment 2, misinformation was given via a written transcript. Participants showed a misinformation effect for two of three targets. In line with previous studies, these results indicate that social information can cause a misinformation effect. The results also suggest that participants may be more easily misled when misleading information is presented via written information than audio-visual information.

We explored the effect of the schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects in an everyday scene. At first, participants watched slides of a man cooking in a kitchen. The man performed schema-consistent actions, and schema-consistent objects were left. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. We confirmed three main results. First, participants made more false recognitions for schema-consistent distracters than for schema-inconsistent distracters with more "remember" judgments accompanied by perceptual, thought, and contextual details, and with more "know" judgments. Second, participants made more false recognitions for schema-consistent object distracters than for schema-consistent action distracters. Third, participants more frequently recognized schema-consistent action targets than schema-consistent object targets with more "remember" judgments. Both action memory and object memory were reconstructed under the schema, provoking false recognitions for schema-consistent distracters. However, the memories of schema-consistent action targets were so recollective that they could prevent false recognitions for schema-consistent action distracters.

The present study had two major purposes. First it sought to determine to what extent in an earlier study of distance estimation in stairways (Hanyu & Itsukushima, 1995) would generalize to other types of stairway. Second, it sought to examine which hypothesis, information storage or effort, better explain the earlier results, in which people overestimated distance and traversed time estimates. We obtained four distance and time measures: distance estimate, traversal time estimate, mental walking time and actual traversal time. To measure information, we had participants rate each stairway for complexity (simple-complex) and effort (effortless-effortful) before and after the distance and time measurement tasks. The results revealed that the earlier findings (Hanyu & Itsukushima, 1995) did not fully generalize. The results also did not support either the information storage or the effort hypothesis.