No abstract

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to design a distributed real-time electricity pricing mechanism. Our approach is novel in that it guarantees individual rationality, meaning that it provides suppliers and consumers with a guaranteed incentive to participate in the real-time pricing market. Such an incentive is devised by offering a time-varying, situation-dependent subsidy that guarantees that a supplier/consumer profits by switching from a fixed-price contract to the real-time pricing contract. Although we assume that suppliers and consumers decide supply and demand quantities in a fully distributed manner to maximize their own profit, the proposed mechanism guarantees under moderate conditions that the market converges through an iterative process to a Nash equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. Furthermore, in order to guarantee safe operation of an electrical grid, our pricing mechanism increases stability of load frequency control, and at the same time, achieves supply-demand equilibrium by explicitly taking into account an equality constraint through dual decomposition method. We empirically demonstrate by simulations the individual rationality of the proposed mechanism as well as the convergence to supply-demand equilibrium.

The safety and the efficacy of TES to estimate the residual inner-retinal function in patients with retinal degeneration indicate that TES can be used as one of the most important test to select candidates for retinal prostheses.

No abstract

TES activates principally the retinal ganglion cells, and a change in the blood flow is initiated thereafter.

Reflectance changes after STS were localized to the area around the electrode. The strong correlation between the area of the reflectance changes and the amplitude of the EPs suggested that the reflectance changes reflected the activity of retinal neurons elicited by electrical stimulation.

No abstract

No abstract