We wanted to learn whether activity in the same area(s) of the brain correlate with the experience of beauty derived from different sources. 21 subjects took part in a brain-scanning experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Prior to the experiment, they viewed pictures of paintings and listened to musical excerpts, both of which they rated on a scale of 1–9, with 9 being the most beautiful. This allowed us to select three sets of stimuli–beautiful, indifferent and ugly–which subjects viewed and heard in the scanner, and rated at the end of each presentation. The results of a conjunction analysis of brain activity showed that, of the several areas that were active with each type of stimulus, only one cortical area, located in the medial orbito-frontal cortex (mOFC), was active during the experience of musical and visual beauty, with the activity produced by the experience of beauty derived from either source overlapping almost completely within it. The strength of activation in this part of the mOFC was proportional to the strength of the declared intensity of the experience of beauty. We conclude that, as far as activity in the brain is concerned, there is a faculty of beauty that is not dependent on the modality through which it is conveyed but which can be activated by at least two sources–musical and visual–and probably by other sources as well. This has led us to formulate a brain-based theory of beauty.

We recorded brain activity when 21 subjects judged the beauty (aesthetic or affective judgment) and brightness (perceptual or cognitive judgment) of simultaneously presented paintings. Aesthetic judgments engaged medial and lateral subdivisions of the orbitofrontal cortex as well as subcortical stations associated with affective motor planning (globus pallidus, putamen-claustrum, amygdala, and cerebellar vermis), whereas the motor, premotor and supplementary motor areas, as well as the anterior insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, were engaged by both kinds of judgment. The results lead us to conclude: (i) that there is a functional specialization for judgment, with aesthetic judgments engaging distinct systems, in addition to those that they share with perceptual judgments; (ii) that the systems engaged by affective judgments are those in which activity correlates with polar experiences (e.g. love-hate, beauty-ugliness, and attraction-repulsion); and (iii) that there is also a functional specialization in the motor pathways, with aesthetic judgments engaging motor systems not engaged by perceptual judgments, in addition to those engaged by both kinds of judgment.

Philosophies of aesthetics have posited that experience of the sublime—commonly but not exclusively derived from scenes of natural grandeur—is distinct from that of beauty and is a counterpoint to it. We wanted to chart the pattern of brain activity which correlates with the declared intensity of experience of the sublime, and to learn whether it differs from the pattern that correlates with the experience of beauty, reported in our previous studies (e.g., Ishizu and Zeki, 2011). 21 subjects participated in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Prior to the experiment, they viewed pictures of landscapes, which they rated on a scale of 1–5, with 5 being the most sublime and 1 being the least. This allowed us to select, for each subject, five sets of stimuli—from ones experienced as very sublime to those experienced as not at all sublime—which subjects viewed and re-rated in the scanner while their brain activity was imaged. The results revealed a distinctly different pattern of brain activity from that obtained with the experience of beauty, with none of the areas active with the latter experience also active during experience of the sublime. Sublime and beautiful experiences thus appear to engage separate and distinct brain systems.

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Sublime encounters provide a compelling example of the peaks of our shared emotional and cognitive experiences. For centuries, these have been a target for philosophy and, more recently, for psychology, with its renewed focus on profound or aesthetic events. The sublime has been theoretically connected to multiple contexts, from interactions with overpowering nature, to beauty, music, even interpersonal engagements, and to multiple emotions-danger, awe, pleasure, fear-often with diametrically opposing arguments for what constitutes these events. However, despite this prolonged discussion, there is still a scarcity of actual systematic research. It is neither known if sublime encounters are actually common, nor how they are described by individuals, or if reports match theoretical arguments-are there one or more, or no, distinct sublime types? We address these questions by matching historical discussions to 402 participants' (Western adults') reports of whether they have ever experienced the sublime and, if so, how these are described in terms of cognitive/emotional and contextual factors. Roughly half reported having had at least one sublime experience, with accounts involving a range of contexts essentially covering the full spectrum of past theoretical arguments. At the same time, when we considered the cognitive/affective descriptions, using network science and latent class analysis of reported feelings, 90.8% fit one model, with involved communities (or interrelated clusters) of positive emotions, discrepancy, self-awareness, transformation/insight, and, notably, not including negative emotions/fear. We conclude with a discussion of how this might be used as a basis for considering sublime theory and shaping future research.

We addressed the question of the extent to which external information is capable of modifying aesthetic ratings given to two different categories of stimuli-images of faces (which belong to the biological category) and those of abstract paintings with no recognizable objects (which sit in the artifactual category). A total of 51 participants of different national origins rated the beauty of both sets of stimuli, indicating the certainty of their rating; they then re-rated them after being exposed to the opinions of others on their aesthetic status. Of these 51 participants, 42 who met our criteria were selected to complete the experiment. The results showed that individuals were less prone to modifying their ratings of stimuli belonging to the biological category compared to those falling into the artifactual category. We discuss this finding in light of our theoretical Bayesian-Laplacian model and on the evidence given by previous empirical research.

We studied the neural mechanisms that are engaged during the experience of beauty derived from sorrow and from joy, two experiences that share a common denominator (beauty) but are linked to opposite emotional valences. Twenty subjects viewed and rerated, in a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner, 120 images which each had classified into the following four categories: beautiful and sad; beautiful and joyful; neutral; ugly. The medial orbito‐frontal cortex (mOFC) was active during the experience of both types of beauty. Otherwise, the two experiences engaged different parts of the brain: joyful beauty engaged areas linked to positive emotions while sorrowful beauty engaged areas linked to negative experiences. Separate regions of the cerebellum were engaged during experience of the two conditions. A functional connectivity analysis indicated that the activity within the mOFC was modulated by the supplementary motor area/middle cingulate cortex, known to be engaged during empathetic experiences provoked by other peoples' sadness. Hum Brain Mapp 38:4185–4200, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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