The aim of this paper is to begin a conversation about how we read and write about Nietzsche and, relatedly, other figures in the history of philosophy. The principle of charity can appear to be a way to bridge two different interpretative goals: getting the meaning of the text right and offering the best philosophy. I argue that the principle of charity is multiply ambiguous along three different dimensions, which I call "unit," "mode," and "strength": consequently, it is not a single, neutral or independent principle to which we can helpfully appeal and it cannot, in itself, perform this bridging function. Nietzsche, I suggest, is particularly ill-suited to some forms of charitable reading. I compare charity to what I call "misreporting" a philosopher's words, in order to highlight some problematic structural similarities. Finally, I assess what charity might be doing instead, if it is not intended to bridge meaning and best philosophy.Nietzsche imagines Beethoven coming back to life and hearing a performance of one of his works in the very different style of the later nineteenth century: "'That is neither I nor not-I but some third thing'," says Nietzsche's Beethoven, after a long pause, "'-and it seems right in a way [etwas Rechtes], even if it is not exactly right [das Rechte]. But you had better take care what you're doing, for you are the ones who have to listen to it-and the living are right, as our Schiller says. So be right and let me be off again'" (AOM 126; KSA 2, p. 432). 1 Any interpretation of Nietzsche worthy of the name will produce neither the pure Nietzsche, nor the pure thoughts of the interpreter, but some third thing. The aim of this paper is to begin a conversation about that third thing, about how we read and write about Nietzsche's philosophy. By 'we' I mean to pick out those broadly in the analytic tradition of Nietzsche scholarship-to which, if to any interpretative tradition, this author firmly belongs.Of course, the analytic tradition is not the only tradition which might benefit from taking a moment to consider how it uses Nietzsche's words. I focus on the analytic Nietzsche partly
Those who turn to Nietzsche's works are often drawn to his position as an outsider in the philosophical tradition, critical of the views of others. But Nietzsche's reader cannot help asking whether he was advocating a more substantial, positive ethical vision. If there is an answer, it is probably something called 'the affirmation of life'.Typically, when we describe something, now, in English, as 'life-affirming', it is something which made us feel good about lifein general, that is, without regard to a specific situation or circumstance. Often, a so-called 'life-affirming' story features a character who faces misfortune, disadvantage or adversity and does not merely survive, but triumphs. Nietzsche might have approved of the 'lifeaffirming' character in this contemporary sense. His remark, 'what does not kill me makes me stronger' (TI, 'Maxims', 8; also EH, 'Wise', 2), has proved one of the most memorable encapsulations of this ideal.I will stress in this chapter that this ordinary notion is not typically what Nietzsche had in mind when he spoke of the 'affirmation of life'.But it is close enough that it prompts questions which are relevant to Nietzsche's view. A life-affirming experience (in the modern sense) makes us feel that life, in general, is good. Now, as a matter of fact, do we think that life, in general, really is good? If so, the life-affirming experience tracks an important truth, perhaps reminding us when we forget. If life is awfulor if we simply cannot say anything about life's 'goodness' at such a general levelthen the feeling that life is good might amount to deception. The life-affirmer can reply that, even if life is awful (or neutral), we might as well feel good about it. But at least some of us, one supposes, would prefer to feel good about life only if life has earnt it. Our ordinary, contemporary notion of affirmation pushes us towards the question of whether life, as a whole, is good.
Nietzsche, we are often told, had an account of 'self' or 'mind' or a 'philosophical psychology', in which what he calls our 'drives' play a highly significant role. This underpins not merely his understanding of mindin particular, of consciousness and action-but also his positive ethics, be they understood as authenticity, freedom, (self-)knowledge, autonomy, self-creation, or power. But Nietzsche did not have anything like a coherent account of 'the drives' according to which the self, the relationship between thought and action, or consciousness could be explained; consequently, he did not have a stable account of drives on which his positive ethics could rest. By this, I do not mean that his account is incomplete or that it is philosophically indefensible: both would leave open, misleadingly, the possibility of a rational reconstruction of Nietzsche's views; both would already assume more unity and coherence than we find in his texts. Specifically, as I show through detailed analysis, Nietzsche provides varied and inconsistent accounts of (1) what a 'drive' is, (2) how much we can know about drives, and (3) the relationship between drives and conscious deliberations about action. I conclude by questioning the hunt for a Nietzschean theory: is this the best way to be reading him?keywords: history of philosophy, nineteenth-century philosophy, German philosophy, philosophy of mind, action, consciousness, Nietzsche, drives I would like to thank Sebastian Gardner, Ken Gemes, Lucy O'Brien, and the anonymous readers at the
The chapter offers a critical analysis of Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. While the influence of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche is widely documented, the author’s intention here is to ask how Schopenhauer might respond to Nietzsche’s interpretation of his philosophy and his critical challenges and hence, ultimately, to assess the force of Nietzsche’s objections. The chapter considers Nietzsche’s central challenge, beginning with his account of
Amor fati—the love of fate—is one of many Nietzschean terms which seem to point towards a positive ethics, but which appear infrequently and are seldom defined. On a traditional understanding, Nietzsche is asking us to love whatever it is that happens to have happened to us—including (and perhaps especially) all sorts of horrible things. My paper analyses amor fati by looking closely at Nietzsche's most sustained discussion of the concept—in book four of The Gay Science—and at closely related passages in that book. I argue that by ignoring the context in which Nietzsche writes about amor fati in The Gay Science, we are liable to ignore several exegetical and philosophical problems with the traditional understanding of the term. I'll argue for a different interpretation which locates Nietzsche's amor fati within the philosophical project of The Gay Science and which copes better with the objections that plague the traditional view.
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