Moral Psychology with Nietzsche draws from the last two decades of Professor Leiter's writing on Nietzsche, combining substantially revised articles and book chapters into one coherent volume. Those who know Leiter's Nietzsche will recognise the main ideas, but he has organised the material to bring out his central theses, responded to criticisms and clarified his position. Those who know his style will not be surprised to find some biffing and thwacking, but the emphasis in this book is always on argument.Leiter fights a war on two fronts. First, he gives an interpretation of Nietzsche's moral psychology. On this front, interlocutors are other Nietzsche commentators; support comes from Nietzsche's texts. Second, broadly speaking, he defends the (purportedly) Nietzschean view. Nietzsche is not right about everything in moral psychology, just 'much of [it]' (p. 10). On this front, interlocutors are moral philosophers, past and present; support comes from philosophical argumentation and empirical psychology. Leiter's work distinguishes itself by fighting on both fronts, although they are independent. What, then, is the Nietzschean-and-right view?There are several, connected strands, but they can be summarised as follows:(1) Speculative, methodological naturalism (pp. 1-14). 'Methodological' meaning 'calling for continuity with the methods of successful sciences' (pp. 2-3). 'Speculative' because many claims of central relevance to moral psychology had not then been subjected to scientific evaluation: Nietzsche was making good guesses, based on materials he read and on acute observation (p. 83; pp. 5-9).(2) Anti-realism about all values, including moral (pp. 17-66) and epistemic values (pp. 84-111).(3) Sentimentalism. Moral judgments are best explained by emotional responses, namely by 'basic affects' (p. 67) (inclinations and aversions), which are non-cognitive, and by affective responses to these basic affects, which may contain cognitive components (p. 67-83). (4) Type-fact fatalism. 'Heritable type-facts' (p. 9) centrally determine our personality and our behaviour, insofar as it is morally relevant,