Nietzsche’s Ethics of Affirmation*

Abstract

Those who turn to Nietzsche's works are often drawn to his position as an outsider in the philosophical tradition, critical of the views of others. But Nietzsche's reader cannot help asking whether he was advocating a more substantial, positive ethical vision. If there is an answer, it is probably something called 'the affirmation of life'.Typically, when we describe something, now, in English, as 'life-affirming', it is something which made us feel good about lifein general, that is, without regard to a specific situation or circumstance. Often, a so-called 'life-affirming' story features a character who faces misfortune, disadvantage or adversity and does not merely survive, but triumphs. Nietzsche might have approved of the 'lifeaffirming' character in this contemporary sense. His remark, 'what does not kill me makes me stronger' (TI, 'Maxims', 8; also EH, 'Wise', 2), has proved one of the most memorable encapsulations of this ideal.I will stress in this chapter that this ordinary notion is not typically what Nietzsche had in mind when he spoke of the 'affirmation of life'.But it is close enough that it prompts questions which are relevant to Nietzsche's view. A life-affirming experience (in the modern sense) makes us feel that life, in general, is good. Now, as a matter of fact, do we think that life, in general, really is good? If so, the life-affirming experience tracks an important truth, perhaps reminding us when we forget. If life is awfulor if we simply cannot say anything about life's 'goodness' at such a general levelthen the feeling that life is good might amount to deception. The life-affirmer can reply that, even if life is awful (or neutral), we might as well feel good about it. But at least some of us, one supposes, would prefer to feel good about life only if life has earnt it. Our ordinary, contemporary notion of affirmation pushes us towards the question of whether life, as a whole, is good.

Nietzsche on the good of cultural change

“…I make no claims for the accuracy of Nietzsche's judgments; I use them only as an indication of his views on how societies can be refashioned.22 It's debatable how sincerely Nietzsche means the language of ethical naturalism that he sometimes uses, attributing his vision of spiritual hierarchy and glorification of the will to power to the "law" or fundamental character of "Life. "Stern (2020) argues that he does mean it literally, at least in the works of 1887-1888.23 Huddleston (2019) insightfully explores and elaborates this metaphor, especially in Chapter 3, and discusses its implications for Nietzsche's conception of human flourishing in Chapter 6 Berkowitz (2003). also emphasizes the artistry involved in Nietzsche's conception of lawgiving.…”

“…22 22 It's debatable how sincerely Nietzsche means the language of ethical naturalism that he sometimes uses, attributing his vision of spiritual hierarchy and glorification of the will to power to the “law” or fundamental character of “Life.” Stern (2020) argues that he does mean it literally, at least in the works of 1887–1888. …”

Nietzsche: Metaphysician

“…77ff). Indeed, when reviewing the secondary literature one often reads about how Nietzsche aims to ‘free philosophy entirely from metaphysics’ (Emden 2014: 133) or ‘recommends that we dismiss all types of metaphysics’ (Himmelmann 2019: 210) or suggests an ‘opposition to metaphysics in general’ (Stern 2019: 361). At the very least, it looks like ‘Nietzsche is much better understood not as a great German metaphysician’, or even ‘as very interested in metaphysics’ (Pippin 2010: 9).…”