“Some Third Thing”: Nietzsche's Words and the Principle of Charity

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to begin a conversation about how we read and write about Nietzsche and, relatedly, other figures in the history of philosophy. The principle of charity can appear to be a way to bridge two different interpretative goals: getting the meaning of the text right and offering the best philosophy. I argue that the principle of charity is multiply ambiguous along three different dimensions, which I call "unit," "mode," and "strength": consequently, it is not a single, neutral or independent principle to which we can helpfully appeal and it cannot, in itself, perform this bridging function. Nietzsche, I suggest, is particularly ill-suited to some forms of charitable reading. I compare charity to what I call "misreporting" a philosopher's words, in order to highlight some problematic structural similarities. Finally, I assess what charity might be doing instead, if it is not intended to bridge meaning and best philosophy.Nietzsche imagines Beethoven coming back to life and hearing a performance of one of his works in the very different style of the later nineteenth century: "'That is neither I nor not-I but some third thing'," says Nietzsche's Beethoven, after a long pause, "'-and it seems right in a way [etwas Rechtes], even if it is not exactly right [das Rechte]. But you had better take care what you're doing, for you are the ones who have to listen to it-and the living are right, as our Schiller says. So be right and let me be off again'" (AOM 126; KSA 2, p. 432). 1 Any interpretation of Nietzsche worthy of the name will produce neither the pure Nietzsche, nor the pure thoughts of the interpreter, but some third thing. The aim of this paper is to begin a conversation about that third thing, about how we read and write about Nietzsche's philosophy. By 'we' I mean to pick out those broadly in the analytic tradition of Nietzsche scholarship-to which, if to any interpretative tradition, this author firmly belongs.Of course, the analytic tradition is not the only tradition which might benefit from taking a moment to consider how it uses Nietzsche's words. I focus on the analytic Nietzsche partly

The Charitability Gap: Misuses of Interpretive Charity in Academic Philosophy

“…Most philosophers (though we rarely make this explicit) seem to define “charitable interpretation” as the attempt to understand a text as making the strongest argument that can reasonably be found there. In his essay, “Some Third Thing: Nietzsche's Words and the Principle of Charity,” Tom Stern explains charity as generally suggesting that “when faced with two rival interpretations of what someone is saying, we should not interpret her as meaning the one that leaves her in the worse light” (Stern 2016, 288). A charitable interpretation offers the author the benefit of the doubt; rather than immediately assuming that an author is incorrect, inconsistent, or incoherent, the reader should assume that she has not yet discovered the sensible meaning 7…”

“…Stern, following Finlayson, agrees that charity is a “multiply ambiguous” concept (Stern 2016, 287). When we read charitably, are we to assume that an author's ambiguous meanings can be reconciled?…”

“…She offers an account of some political difficulties of charity, particularly as they relate to the kind of dissent that demands for charity to both enable and foreclose (66). Stern explores the conflicting hermeneutic commitments that make it unclear what it means to properly perform a charitable reading (Stern 2016, 289–91). And Yitzhak Melamed explores the anachronistic misreadings that emerge from offering charitable interpretations of texts in the history of philosophy as an attempt to argue for their contemporary relevance (Melamed 2013, 259).…”

Deliberation through Misrepresentation? Inchoate Speech and the Division of Interpretive Labor*

“…Crucially, whether metaphysically or epistemically, charity is used to determine agents' actual attitudes in both of these cases. However, sometimes the "principle of charity" is used in a more colloquial sense to mean an interpretation that goes beyond what an individual actually thought and thereby inaccurately represents it; e.g Stern 2016…”