No abstract

Consistent with action-based theories of attention, the presence of a nontarget stimulus in the environment has been shown to alter the characteristics of goal-directed movements. Specifically, it has been reported that movement trajectories veer away from (Howard & Tipper, 1997) or towards (Welsh, Elliott, & Weeks, 1999) the location of a nontarget stimulus. The purpose of the experiments reported in this paper was to test a response activation model of selective reaching conceived to account for these variable results. In agreement with the model, the trajectory changes in the movements appear to be determined by the activation levels of each competing response at the moment of response initiation. The results of the present work, as well as those of previous studies, are discussed within the framework of the model of response activation. In order to effectively reach to and grasp objects in a complex visual environment, two processes must be completed-the target object must be selected from the competing, nontarget objects, and a movement must be planned to interact with the selected object. Although the processes of selective attention and movement organization have been investigated independently, action-based models of visual selective attention have recently surfaced. For example, Rizzolatti and colleagues have proposed a premotor theory of attention (see Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994, for a review). Citing evidence such as shared spatial and motor mapping systems, and increased activity in early visual perceptual centres

In this article, we challenge the usefulness of "attention" as a unitary construct and/or neural system. We point out that the concept has too many meanings to justify a single term, and that "attention" is used to refer to both the explanandum (the set of phenomena in need of explanation) and the explanans (the set of processes doing the explaining). To illustrate these points, we focus our discussion on visual selective attention. It is argued that selectivity in processing has emerged through evolution as a design feature of a complex multi-channel sensorimotor system, which generates selective phenomena of "attention" as one of many by-products. Instead of the traditional analytic approach to attention, we suggest a synthetic approach that starts with well-understood mechanisms that do not need to be dedicated to attention, and yet account for the selectivity phenomena under investigation. We conclude that what would serve scientific progress best would be to drop the term "attention" as a label for a specific functional or neural system and instead focus on behaviorally relevant selection processes and the many systems that implement them.

A multitude of studies demonstrate that self-relevant stimuli influence attention. Self-owned objects are a special class of self-relevant stimuli. If a self-owned object can indeed be characterised as a self-relevant stimulus then, consistent with theoretical predictions, a behavioural effect of ownership on attention should be present. To test this prediction, a task was selected that is known to be particularly sensitive measure of the prioritisation of visual information: the temporal order judgement. Participants completed temporal order judgements with pictures of "own" and "experimenter" owned objects (mugs) presented on either side of a central fixation cross. There was a variable onset delay between each picture, ranging between 0 ms and 105 ms, and participants were asked to indicate which mug appeared first. The results indicated a reliable change in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) in favour of their own mug. Such a change in the PSS was not observed for two groups of participants who were exposed to a mug but did not keep the mug. A further experiment indicated that the source of the bias in PSS was more consistent with a criterion shift or top-down attentional prioritisation rather than a perceptual bias. These findings suggest that ownership, beyond mere-touch, mere-choice, or familiarity, leads to prioritised processing and responses, but the mechanism underlying the effect is not likely to be perceptual in nature.

Inhibition of return (IOR) has been shown to occur when an individual returns to a target location (within-person IOR) and when an individual moves to a location just engaged by another individual (between-person IOR). Although within- and between-person IOR likely result from the same inhibitory mechanisms, different processes must activate these mechanisms following the performance and observation of action. Consistent with the suggestion that the mirror neuron system may be responsible for activating the inhibitory mechanisms behind IOR on observation trials, between-person IOR was only detected under restricted viewing conditions known to activate mirror neurons. These results indicate that mirror neuron system may be involved in both higher-order and automatic cognitive behavior.