Statistics in Practice is an important international series of texts, which provide detailed coverage of statistical concepts, methods and worked case studies in specific fields of investigation and study.With sound motivation and many worked practical examples, the books show in down-to-earth terms how to select and use an appropriate range of statistical techniques in a particular practical field within each title's special topic area.The books provide statistical support for professionals and research workers across a range of employment fields and research environments. Subject areas covered include medicine and pharmaceutics; industry, finance and commerce; public services; the earth and environmental sciences, and so on.The books also provide support to students studying statistical courses applied to the above areas. The demand for graduates to be equipped for the work environment has led to such courses becoming increasingly prevalent at universities and colleges.It is our aim to present judiciously chosen and well-written workbooks to meet everyday practical needs. The feedback of views from readers will be most valuable to monitor the success of this aim.A complete list of titles in this series appears at the end of the volume.ii

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A striking finding has emerged recently in the literature: When decision makers are faced with essentially the same choice, their preferences differ as a function of whether options are described or are ''experienced'' via observation and feedback. For example, when presented the described choice: (A) A 90% chance of $0 and a 10% chance of $10 or (B) $1 for sure, people tend to prefer (A). But when those same two options are experienced through observation of ''draws'' from two payoff distributions that match the described options, the modal preference reverses. Why? This is just one question that the papers in this special issue address. In addition, they address the rich repertoire of issues that arise when one considers experience-based choices. The decisions-fromexperience paradigm-with its focus on the acquisition and integration of information prior to choice, as well the choice itself-taps many of the fundamentals of psychology (learning, memory, encoding, knowledge representation, modelling) thus inspiring novel and fruitful avenues for research. This paper reviews recent research on experience-based choice, and highlights the contribution of the papers in the special issue. The paper introduces a framework that places different types of decisions along a continuum of uncertainty about what one is choosing between, which emphasizes the rich and varied role of ''experience'' in decision making. It ends by identifying important unsolved questions that are ripe for future research.

There are reliable individual differences in the extent to which people consider the long- and short-term consequences of their behaviors. Such differences, assessed by the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale (A. Strathman, F. Gleicher, D. S. Boninger, & C. S. Edwards, 1994), are hypothesized to influence the impact of a persuasive communication. In an experimental study, the time frame of occurrence of positive and negative consequences of engaging in a new colorectal cancer-screening program was manipulated in a sample of two hundred twenty 50-69-year-old men and women. CFC moderated (a) the processing of short- versus long-term consequences and (b) the persuasive impact of the different communications on behavioral intentions. Low CFC individuals produced more positive thoughts and were more persuaded when positive consequences were short term and negative consequences were long term. The opposite was true for high CFC individuals.

It can be remarkably difficult to determine whether two photographs of unfamiliar faces depict the same person or two different people. This fallibility is well established in the face perception and eyewitness domain, but most of this research has focused on the "average" observer by measuring mean performance across groups of participants. This study deviated from this convention to provide a detailed description of individual differences and observer consistency in unfamiliar face identification by assessing performance repeatedly, across a 3-day (Experiment 1) and a 5-day period (Experiment 2). Both experiments reveal considerable variation between but also within observers. This variation is such that the same observers frequently made different identification decisions to the same faces on different days (Experiment 1). And when new faces were shown on each day, observers that produced perfect accuracy on one day made many misidentifications on another (Experiment 2). However, a few individuals also performed with consistent high accuracy in these tests. These findings suggest that accuracy and consistency are separable indices of face-matching ability, and both measures are necessary to provide a precise index of a person's face processing skill. We discuss whether these measures could provide the basis for a selection tool for occupations that depend on accurate person identification.

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of "unconscious thought" for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage "unconscious thought processes"). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made "unconsciously", but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving "online judgement" rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to "stop thinking" about complex decisions.

Examination of search strategies has tended to focus on choices determined by decision makers' personal preferences among relevant cues, and not on learning cue-criterion relationships. We present an empirical and rational analysis of cue search for environments with objective criteria. In such environments, cues can be evaluated on the basis of three properties: validity (the probability that a cue identifies the correct choice if cue values differ between alternatives); discrimination rate (the proportion of occasions on which a cue has differing values); and success (the expected proportion of correct choices when only that cue can be used). Our experiments show that though there is a high degree of individual variability, success is a key determinant of search. Furthermore, a rational analysis demonstrates why success-directed search is the most adaptive strategy in many circumstances. Copyright # 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. key words search strategies; heuristics; cue hierarchies, adaptive behaviors When faced with a decision it is often impossible to consider all of the options, their attributes and their potential consequences simultaneously, so we must do so sequentially. The order that we adopt to dictate this sequential search may have profound effects on our decisions and the consequences of those decisions (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). In this paper we present a new conceptualization of search in decision making in which search is dictated by the ''success'' of information in predicting the correct outcomes of decisions. Success is a function of the likelihood that a piece of information is usable and its accuracy in leading to a correct inference. We report empirical evidence showing that people's search patterns are allied to those determined by success, and a rational analysis that demonstrates the variety of circumstances in which success-directed search achieves the best outcomes.Decision making can be considered to have three component processes: information acquisition; evaluation/action; and feedback/learning (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981;Payne, 1982). Arguably, information acquisition has received the least attention of these three aspects. Indeed, Anderson (1990) notes that the literature

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