Remittances may have an impact on economic growth through channels to physical and human capital. We estimate two variants of an open economy model of these two channels consisting of seven equations using the general method of moments with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation correction (GMM-HAC) with pooled data for four different samples of countries receiving remittances in 2003. The countries with per capita income below $1200 benefit most from remittances in the long run because they have the largest impact of remittances on savings. Their remittances account for about 2% of the steady-state level of GDP per capita when compared to the counterfactual of having no remittances. Their ratio of the steady-state growth rates with and without remittances is 1.39. Transitional gains are higher than the steady-state gains only for the human capital variables of this sample. As savings react much more strongly than investment an important benefit of remittances is that less debt is incurred and less debt service is paid than without remittances. The elasticity of the GNI/GDP ratio with respect to the remittance/GDP ratio is .002. All effects are much weaker for the richer countries.

This paper focuses on a model in which low (high) export demand elasticities and the fact that developing countries are importers of capital goods help explaining the slow (high) growth of these countries. The question arises whether export demand elasticities are low or high. For answering this question, export demand elasticities for the case of Brazil are estimated using a growth model. As a by-product of estimating the model, we obtain estimates for total-factor productivity growth and for scale economies. Based on the results from estimation we calculate steady-state growth rates, engine and handmaiden effects of growth as well as dynamic steady-state gains from trade. The model and the results are discussed in regard to several strands of literature.

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Using a vector-error-correction model (VECM) with total factor productivity (TFP), domestic and foreign research and development investment (R&D) as well as GDP, we find that for the Netherlands for the period 1968-2014, extra investment in public and private R&D has a clear positive effect on TFP growth and GDP. Taking into account the costs of these extra investments, we find that the rate of return to such a policy is positive and high. We also find dynamic complementarity of public and private stocks of R&D for a long period after the initial shock. However, our results also show that the productivity effects on the Dutch economy are weaker when they are part of an internationally concerted policy effort, i.e. when other OECD countries implement policies with the same effects on R&D stocks in their countries. While complements in the long run equations of the model, in the adjustment process Dutch domestic private R&D appears to consider foreign public R&D as a substitute, i.e. when foreign public R&D rises, Dutch private R&D tends to shrink.

The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis holds even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competititon, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we evaluate, though, we detect an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies. Keywords AbstractThe Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis holds even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competititon, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we evaluate, though, we detect an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.

How much does public capital matter for economic growth? How large should it be? This paper attempts to answer these questions, taking the case of SSA countries. It develops and estimates a model that posits a nonlinear relationship between public investment and growth, to determine the growth-maximizing public investment GDP share. It empirically also accounts for the crowding-in and crowding-out e¤ects between public and private investment, with equations estimated separately and simultaneously, using System GMM. The paper further runs simulation and examines the public investment GDP share that maximizes consumption. This is estimated to be between 8:4 percent and 11:0 percent. The results from estimating the growth model are in the middle of this range, which is larger than the observed value of 7:2 percent at the end of the sample period. These outcomes suggest that, on average, there has been public under-investment in Africa, contrary to previous …ndings. JEL Classi…cation: O4; H4

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