This paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in Brazilian elections. Estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual (error‐ridden and uncounted) votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens. Estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology's phase‐in across states over time suggest that, as predicted by political economy models, it shifted government spending toward health care, which is particularly beneficial to the poor. Positive effects on both the utilization of health services (prenatal visits) and newborn health (low‐weight births) are also found for less educated mothers, but not for the more educated.

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Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions could signal personality traits, like ambition, that are undesirable in the marriage market? We answer this question through two field experiments in an elite U.S. MBA program. Newly-admitted MBA students filled out a questionnaire on job preferences and personality traits to be used by the career center in internship placement; randomly-selected students thought their answers would be shared with classmates. When they believed their classmates would not see their responses, single and nonsingle women answered similarly. However, single women reported desired yearly compensation $18,000 lower and being willing to travel seven fewer days per month and work four fewer hours per week when they expected their classmates would see their answers. They also reported less professional ambition and tendency for leadership. Neither men nor non-single women changed their answers in response to peer observability. A supplementary experiment asked students to make choices over hypothetical jobs before discussing their choices in their career class small groups; we randomly varied the groups' gender composition. Single women were much less likely to select career-focused jobs when their answers would be shared with male peers, especially single ones. Two results from observational data support our experimental results. First, in a new survey, almost three-quarters of single female students reported avoiding activities they thought would help their career because they did not want to appear ambitious. They eschewed these activities at higher rates than did men and non-single women. Second, while unmarried women perform similarly to married women in class when their performance is kept private from classmates (on exams and problem sets), they have significantly lower participation grades.

This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We nd that treatment reduces the prevalence of clientelism and does not affect turnout. Treatment also lowers the vote shares for the candidate with a political stronghold in the village and is more effective in garnering votes in regions where a candidate does not have a political stronghold. (JEL D72, O17) E lections in developing countries are often characterized by clientelism-the practice of garnering the vote of constituencies through gifts and the promise of favors and patronage. Research in economics and political science suggests that such targeted redistribution is inef cient but electorally effective. In contrast, broad public good provision is associated with better economic outcomes but is politically costly. The literature suggests no real alternative to clientelism, at least in the short run; the practice is perceived as a re ection of agrarian social relations and ethnic cleavages. Promises of broad public good provision tend not to be credible in new democracies where politicians and parties have not interacted long enough with voters.

This paper uses exogenous variation in electoral rules to test the predictions of strategic voting models and the causal validity of Duverger's Law. Estimations based on a regression discontinuity design in the assignment of single-ballot and dual-ballot (runoff) electoral systems in Brazilian mayoral races indicate that, in accordance to Duverger's Law, single-ballot plurality rule causes voters to desert third placed candidates and vote for the two most popular ones. I find that the effects are stronger in close elections, and that candidates' characteristics and entry cannot account for the results, suggesting that strategic voting is the driving force behind these findings.