Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin

Abstract

This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We nd that treatment reduces the prevalence of clientelism and does not affect turnout. Treatment also lowers the vote shares for the candidate with a political stronghold in the village and is more effective in garnering votes in regions where a candidate does not have a political stronghold. (JEL D72, O17) E lections in developing countries are often characterized by clientelism-the practice of garnering the vote of constituencies through gifts and the promise of favors and patronage. Research in economics and political science suggests that such targeted redistribution is inef cient but electorally effective. In contrast, broad public good provision is associated with better economic outcomes but is politically costly. The literature suggests no real alternative to clientelism, at least in the short run; the practice is perceived as a re ection of agrarian social relations and ethnic cleavages. Promises of broad public good provision tend not to be credible in new democracies where politicians and parties have not interacted long enough with voters.

Clientelism in Indian Villages

“…Other work of theirs (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2005, 2006 analyzes whether a move toward decentralized governance in India has been effective in delivering government services and poverty alleviation schemes to the poor. Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013); and Vicente and Wantchekon (2009) in West Africa. Finan and Shechter (2012) demonstrate how vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity using data from Paraguay.…”

Will a Five-Minute Discussion Change Your Mind? A Countrywide Experiment on Voter Choice in France

“…Well-powered precinct-level randomized evaluations of field campaigns, including those fully embedded in a candidate's campaign, have studied the effects on vote shares of campaign activities that require fewer human resources and are less direct and personal than door-to-door canvassing, such as direct mail (e.g., Rogers and Middleton 2015), phone and robo calls (e.g., Shaw et al 2012), and town hall meetings (e.g., Wantchekon 2003). These types of contact generate relatively larger effects for weaker candidates (Gerber 2004;Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013). The messages also generate larger effects when they emphasize valence rather than ideology (Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2015), and, in developing countries, clientelist rather than public policy platforms (Wantchekon 2003).…”

State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature

“…Such political clientelism, even while helping some poor people, can harm the cause of general pro-poor public investments. Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) cite some experimental evidence from Benin that shows how informed public deliberation in town hall meetings can reduce clientelism.…”