Income and wealth inequality are rising in most countries around the world today. Recognising that this challenge has become a universal issue, the United Nations agreed in 2015 to seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as part of a global agenda to transform society. Specifically, SDG Target 10 commits countries to 'reduce inequalities within and among countries'. To what extent SDGs and in particular SDG target 10 can help nations reverse inequality towards a downward trend is the question we address in this paper. To answer this question, we build on the theory of change underpinning the goal-based governance characterising the SDGs, then we infer the added value of the SDGs along three criteria: the production of a common metric, the capacity to emulate peer pressure, and policy learning within and across countries. Across these three criteria, our main finding is that there is much that states can take away from the SDGs to address the problem of rising inequality, though success is conditional on achieving the buy-in of key actors and epistemic communities for which domestic inequalities remains a domestic issue and not a global sustainability one. Policy Implications• There is much that states can take away from the SDGs to address the problem of rising inequality, though success is conditional on achieving the buy-in of key actors and epistemic communities for which domestic inequalities remains a domestic issue and not a global sustainability one• The first major contribution of the SDGs is the old clich e, 'what gets measured gets done'. The guarantee of standardized, comparable statistics is likely to serve as a catalyst for political action to reduce inequality. At the very least, it serves as an enabler for civil society and other non-government institutions to hold governments to account.• Second, and relatedly, the SDGs create a forum in which countries' performances are ranked against each other. The SDGs enable us to distinguish between those countries that are performing well and those falling behind, while serving to remind political leaders that inequality reduction is not just necessary but possible.

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What are the sources of commodity price volatility changes? Based on observation of the palm‐oil market (1818–1999). our hypothesis is that the superimposition of short‐distance operators located near the export supply, whose expectation horizon is limited to a few weeks, and long‐distance operators further from the export supply, whose expectation horizon exceeds six months to one year, is responsible for volatility changes and market instability. Because of the superimposition of expectations horizons, volatility grows along with the development of short‐distance trade. We support this hypothesis using a trader‐behavior model derived from Day and Huang [J. Econ. Behavior Org. 14 (1990) 299] and Day [Complex Economic Dynamics, Vol. I. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. Our simulation results challenge the argument that trade liberalization and market enlargement necessarily reduce commodity prices volatility.

This article addresses the implications and remaining challenges behind the seemingly happy ending of the recent EU–China trade dispute on solar products. First, the EU's choice of a specific trade defence measure – anti-dumping – was based on shaky arguments. Second, further trade disputes on green goods are very likely, in particular because China is increasingly implementing domestic support policies on green sectors, bringing down Chinese export prices. Third, trade defence measures could be adopted as an expensive option. Alternatively to this, the EU and China could consider setting up constructive and preventive mechanisms in order to stabilize trade and broaden their economic relationship. Policy relevance In July 2013 the EU accepted an undertaking by Chinese solar wafer, cell, and module manufacturers to fix minimum import prices for their products, along with a volume cap to be imposed on Chinese solar exports to the EU. In spite of the seemingly happy end of a trade dispute between the two major players in the renewables sector, we show that the possibility of trade disputes over low-carbon products in the near future cannot be ruled out. Drawing on the China–EU photovoltaic 'dumping case', we highlight some weaknesses in the EU's choice to resort to anti-dumping measures and emphasize the urgent need to invent new forms of trade dialogues between the EU and China as first-choice trade dispute settlement policies. (Résumé d'auteur

Border carbon adjustment (BCA) has had a high profile in climate and trade talks, due to differences between the EU and China. Much of the debate has revolved around the possibility of EU taxation on Chinese exported products in order to both avoid carbon leakage and support the EU's unilateral efforts to curb CO 2 emissions. This article examines the motives behind the rejection of BCA by Chinese officials. In addition to the conventional argument that BCA is inefficient and unfair, new explanations are provided for China's stance. First, China claims that its exports of energy-intensive products are already taxed, with the CO 2 e price for Chinese export taxation averaging European Union Emissions Trading Scheme CO 2 price levels. Second, the EU trade dispute concerning Chinese export restrictions -occurring just a few years after disputes concerning the subsidization of similar productsprovides evidence that the EU's stance on trade issues is incoherent, casting doubt on its willingness to genuinely get the carbon price right for products entering its market. Finally, BCA options contemplated by Annex I countries unilaterally convey the signal that China is perpetually falling short of international standards and of sharply increasing responsibilities.Les mesures d'ajustements aux frontières (MAF) pour le carbone furent l'objet d'une forte visibilité au sein des négociations sur le climat et le commerce, dû aux différences entre l'UE et la Chine. Une grande partie du débat a porté sur la possibilité d'une taxe européenne sur les produits de l'exportation chinoise de manière à éviter les fuites de carbone tout en favorisant les efforts unilatéraux de réduction des émissions de CO 2 de l'UE. Cet article examine les motifs à la base du rejet des MAF de la part des fonctionnaires chinois. En plus de l'argument conventionnel quant à la nature inefficace et injuste des MAF, de nouvelles explications sont données pour la position chinoise. Premièrement, la Chine soutient que ses exportations de produits à forte intensité énergétique sont déjà soumis à une taxe, le prix de la taxe appliquée au CO 2 -équivalent de l'exportation des produits chinois correspondant en moyenne au niveau du prix du CO 2 dans le SCEQE. Deuxièmement, le débat de l'UE sur le commerce concernant les restrictions des exportations chinoises -ayant lieu quelques années seulement après le débat concernant la subvention de produits similaires -démontre l'incohérence de la position de l'UE sur la question commerciale et remet en question l'authenticité de sa volonté de justesse dans la fixation du prix du carbone pour les produits accédant à son marché. Finalement, les options pour les MAF contemplées par les pays de l'Annexe I sont celles qui indiquent unilatéralement une incapacité perpétuelle de la Chine à satisfaire les standards internationaux et de responsabilités fortement accrues.

Blended finance and public private partnerships are landmark mechanisms for sustainable development financing. They are flagged by development finance institutions as promising means to bridge the post-2015 development investment gap. However, the effectiveness of their potential contribution to financing the post-2015 development agenda remains far from certain. Not only do their definitions differ from one institution to another, but also their performance in leveraging funding and channeling it to the most needful goals and countries has not been properly assessed, mostly due to the lack of empirical evidence. In this chapter, we aim to explain why these two financing vehicles fall short of delivering on promises. We provide insight on some possible means to overcome their current limitations.

[eng] Nonlinear dynamics in world vegetable oils prices . Price dynamics analysis provides key information on the possible consequences one can expect from the opening up and the liberalization of agricultural markets. The potential role of chaotic dynamics in generating world vegetable oils prices is investigated here with more than 1400 weekly data. The evidence of a pure chaotic determinism cannot be accepted, while the proof of nonlinear dynamics in prices remains strong and casts some doubt on the market's ability to find out its equilibrium position and stabilize by itself. [fre] L'étude de la dynamique des prix fournit des informations intéressantes sur les conséquences à attendre d'un changement des structures concurrentielles et d'une ouverture des marchés sur l'instabilité. Nous avons mené cette étude sur le marché mondial des huiles. Si l'hypothèse d'un pur chaos déterministe ne peut être acceptée, la présence d'une dynamique non linéaire très forte est démontrée. Elle confirme l'hypothèse d'une instabilité endogène, autogénérée, une instabilité propre au fonctionnement du marché.