Undernutrition during pregnancy reduces birth weight and programmes adult phenotype with consequences for life expectancy, but its effects on the phenotype of the placenta, responsible for supplying nutrients for fetal growth, remain largely unknown. Using molecular, morphological and functional analyses, placental phenotype was examined in mice during restriction of dietary intake to 80% of control from day 3 of pregnancy. At day 16, undernutrition reduced placental, but not fetal, weight in association with decreased junctional zone volume and placental expression of glucose transporter Slc2a1. At day 19, both placental and fetal weights were reduced in undernourished mice (91% and 87% of control, respectively, P < 0.01), as were the volume and surface area of the labyrinthine zone responsible for placental nutrient transfer (85% and 86%, respectively, P < 0.03). However, unidirectional materno-fetal clearance of tracer glucose was maintained and methyl-aminoisobutyric acid increased 166% (P < 0.005) per gram of undernourished placenta, relative to controls. This was associated with an 18% and 27% increased placental expression of glucose and system A amino acid transporters Slc2a1 and Slc38a2, respectively, at day 19 (P < 0.04). At both ages, undernutrition decreased expression of the placental specific transcript of the Igf2 gene by 35% (P < 0.01), although methylation of its promoter was unaffected. The placenta, therefore, adapts to help maintain fetal growth when its own growth is compromised by maternal undernutrition. Consequently, placental phenotype is responsive to environmental conditions and may help predict the risk of adult disease programmed in utero.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri bution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. AbstractA 2017 Nature report was widely touted as hailing the arrival of the artificial womb.But the scientists involved claim their technology is merely an improvement in neonatal care. This raises an under-considered question: what differentiates neonatal incubation from artificial womb technology? Considering the nature of gestation-or metaphysics of pregnancy-(a) identifies more profound differences between fetuses and neonates/babies than their location (in or outside the maternal body) alone: fetuses and neonates have different physiological and physical characteristics; (b) characterizes birth as a physiological, mereological and topological transformation as well as a (morally relevant) change of location; and (c) delivers a clear distinction between neonatal incubation and ectogestation: the former supports neonatal physiology; the latter preserves fetal physiology. This allows a detailed conceptual classification of ectogenetive and ectogestative technologies according to which the 2017 system is not just improved neonatal incubation, but genuine ectogestation. But it is not an artificial womb, which is a term that is better put to rest. The analysis reveals that any ethical discussion involving ectogestation must always involve considerations of possible risks to the mother as well as her autonomy and rights. It also adds a third and potentially important dimension to debates in reproductive ethics: the physiological transition from fetus/gestateling to baby/neonate. K E Y W O R D S artificial womb, ectogenesis, ectogestation, ethics, fetus, gestateling, metaphysics, pregnancy | 355 KINGMA ANd FINN | INTRODUC TI ONIn 2017 Nature reported a successful extra-uterine support system for extremely premature lambs. 1 This was variously reported as "a uterus-like plastic sack," 2 a "unique womb-like device" 3 and, more often, an "artificial womb." 4 It sparked widespread media speculation about the imminent arrival of human ectogenesis, 5 to the express frustration of the authors of the study who are notably careful to avoid any such terminology in their article. 6They state their "goal is not to extend the current limits of viability" 7 but strictly to improve "the outcomes for those infants who are already […] cared for in neonatal intensive care units." 8 Yet the media reaction is hardly surprising. The idea of artificial gestation-of growing "babies in bottles"-has a proud and prominent place in our cultural history. 9 And although the promise of a genuine artificial womb remains sci-fi, its lure is understandable;what pregnant person has not wished-albeit only briefly-that they could leave their "body in its bulk and weight" 10 ; or that she could "park her fetus on a shelf" 11 -and run, drink, smoke, jump, dance, work or make love ad libitum, free from the risks, burdens and moral and physical constrai...

Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the Adoption Problem causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not.

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In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI). I show this through a detailed analysis of the 'adoption problem', which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and (most relevantly to logical pluralism) required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.