This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri bution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. AbstractA 2017 Nature report was widely touted as hailing the arrival of the artificial womb.But the scientists involved claim their technology is merely an improvement in neonatal care. This raises an under-considered question: what differentiates neonatal incubation from artificial womb technology? Considering the nature of gestation-or metaphysics of pregnancy-(a) identifies more profound differences between fetuses and neonates/babies than their location (in or outside the maternal body) alone: fetuses and neonates have different physiological and physical characteristics; (b) characterizes birth as a physiological, mereological and topological transformation as well as a (morally relevant) change of location; and (c) delivers a clear distinction between neonatal incubation and ectogestation: the former supports neonatal physiology; the latter preserves fetal physiology. This allows a detailed conceptual classification of ectogenetive and ectogestative technologies according to which the 2017 system is not just improved neonatal incubation, but genuine ectogestation. But it is not an artificial womb, which is a term that is better put to rest. The analysis reveals that any ethical discussion involving ectogestation must always involve considerations of possible risks to the mother as well as her autonomy and rights. It also adds a third and potentially important dimension to debates in reproductive ethics: the physiological transition from fetus/gestateling to baby/neonate. K E Y W O R D S artificial womb, ectogenesis, ectogestation, ethics, fetus, gestateling, metaphysics, pregnancy | 355 KINGMA ANd FINN | INTRODUC TI ONIn 2017 Nature reported a successful extra-uterine support system for extremely premature lambs. 1 This was variously reported as "a uterus-like plastic sack," 2 a "unique womb-like device" 3 and, more often, an "artificial womb." 4 It sparked widespread media speculation about the imminent arrival of human ectogenesis, 5 to the express frustration of the authors of the study who are notably careful to avoid any such terminology in their article. 6They state their "goal is not to extend the current limits of viability" 7 but strictly to improve "the outcomes for those infants who are already […] cared for in neonatal intensive care units." 8 Yet the media reaction is hardly surprising. The idea of artificial gestation-of growing "babies in bottles"-has a proud and prominent place in our cultural history. 9 And although the promise of a genuine artificial womb remains sci-fi, its lure is understandable;what pregnant person has not wished-albeit only briefly-that they could leave their "body in its bulk and weight" 10 ; or that she could "park her fetus on a shelf" 11 -and run, drink, smoke, jump, dance, work or make love ad libitum, free from the risks, burdens and moral and physical constrai...

The literature on health and diseases is usually presented as an opposition between naturalism and normativism. This article argues that such a picture is too simplistic: there is not one opposition between naturalism and normativism, but many. I distinguish four different domains where naturalist and normativist claims can be contrasted: (1) ordinary usage, (2) conceptually clean versions of "health" and "disease," (3) the operationalization of dysfunction, and (4) the justification for that operationalization. In the process I present new arguments in response to Schwartz (2007) and Hausman (2012) and expose a link between the arguments made by Schwartz (2007) and Kingma (2010). Distinguishing naturalist claims at these four domains will allow us to make progress by (1) providing more nuanced, intermediate positions about a possible role for values in health and disease; and (2) assisting in the addressing of relativistic worries about the value-ladenness of health and disease.

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Is the mammalian embryo/fetus a part of the organism that gestates it? According to the containment view, the fetus is not a part of, but merely contained within or surrounded by, the gestating organism. According to the parthood view, the fetus is a part of the gestating organism. This paper proceeds in two stages. First, I argue that the containment view is the received view; that it is generally assumed without good reason; and that it needs substantial support if it is to be taken seriously. Second, I argue that the parthood view derives considerable support from a range of biological and physiological considerations. I tentatively conclude in favour of the parthood view, and end by identifying some of the interesting questions it raises.

Introduction Disrespect and abuse during labour and birth are increasingly reported all over the world. In 2016, a Dutch client organization initiated an online campaign, #genoeggezwegen (#breakthesilence) which encouraged women to share negative and traumatic maternity care experiences. This study aimed (1) to determine what types of disrespect and abuse were described in #genoeggezwegen and (2) to gain a more detailed understanding of these experiences. Methods A qualitative social media content analysis was carried out in two phases. (1) A deductive coding procedure was carried out to identify types of disrespect and abuse, using Bohren et al.'s existing typology of mistreatment during childbirth. (2) A separate, inductive coding procedure was performed to gain further understanding of the data. Results 438 #genoeggezwegen stories were included. Based on the typology of mistreatment during childbirth, it was found that situations of ineffective communication, loss of autonomy and lack of informed consent and confidentiality were most often described. The inductive analysis revealed five major themes: ''lack of informed consent"; ''not being taken seriously and