Developing the "right" new products is critical to firm success and is often cited as a key competitive dimension. This paper explores new product development (NPD) portfolio strategy and the balance between incremental and radical innovation. We characterize innovative effort through a normative theoretical framework that addresses a popular practice in NPD portfolio management: the use of strategic buckets. Strategic buckets encourage the division of the overall NPD resource budget into smaller, more focused budgets that are defined by the type of innovative effort (incremental or radical). We show that time commitment determines the balance between incremental and radical innovation. When managers execute this balance, they are often confounded by (i) environmental complexity, defined as the number of unknown interdependencies among technology and market parameters that determine product performance; and (ii) environmental instability, the probability of changes to the underlying performance functions. Although both of these factors confound managers, we find that they have completely opposite effects on the NPD portfolio balance. Environmental complexity shifts the balance toward radical innovation. Conversely, environmental instability shifts the balance toward incremental innovation. Risk considerations and implications for theory and practice are also discussed.new product development, NPD portfolio strategy, incremental innovation, radical innovation, strategic buckets, complex systems, evolutionary systems

Selecting program portfolios within a budget constraint is an important challenge in the management of new product development (NPD). Optimal portfolios are difficult to define because of the combinatorial complexity of project combinations. However, at the aggregate level of the strategic allocation of resources across product lines, investment in a program is not an all-or-nothing decision, but can be adjusted, resulting in a higher or lower program benefit (e.g., higher or lower quality). In some cases, resources can be adjusted even for individual projects. With this insight, one can use marginal analysis to optimally allocate the scarce budget. This article develops a dynamic model of resource allocation, taking into account multiple interacting factors, such as independent or correlated, uncertain market payoffs that change over time, increasing or decreasing returns from the NPD investment, carry-over of the investment benefit over multiple periods, and interactions across market segments. We characterize optimal policies in closed form and derive qualitative decision rules for managers.new product development, resource allocation, portfolio selection, portfolio investment, dynamic programming, marginal benefits

International audienceSince Osborn's Applied Imagination book in 1953 (Osborn, A. F. 1953. Applied Imagination: Principles and Procedures of Creative Thinking. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York), the effectiveness of brainstorming has been widely debated. While some researchers and practitioners consider it the standard idea generation and problem-solving method in organizations, part of the social science literature has argued in favor of nominal groups, i.e., the same number of individuals generating solutions in isolation. In this paper, we revisit this debate, and we explore the implications that the underlying problem structure and the team diversity have on the quality of the best solution as obtained by the different group configurations. We build on the normative search literature of new product development, and we show that no group configuration dominates. Therefore, nominal groups perform better in specialized problems, even when the factors that affect the solution quality exhibit complex interactions (problem complexity). In cross-functional problems, the brainstorming group exploits the competence diversity of its participants to attain better solutions. However, their advantage vanishes for extremely complex problems

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The first step in transforming strategy from a hopeful statement about the future into an operational reality is to allocate resources to innovation and new product development (NPD) programs in a portfolio. Resource allocation and NPD portfolio decisions often span multiple levels of the organization's hierarchy, leading to questions about how much authority to bestow on managers and how to structure incentives for NPD. In this study, we explore how funding authority and incentives affect a manager's allocation of resources between existing product improvement (relatively incremental projects) and new product development (more radical projects). Funding may be either fixed or variable depending on the extent to which the manager has the authority to use revenue derived from existing product sales to fund NPD efforts. We find that the use of variable funding drives higher effort toward improving existing products and developing new products. However, variable funding has a subtle side effect: it induces the manager to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than new product development, and the relative balance in the NPD portfolio shifts toward incremental innovation. In addition, we highlight a substitution effect between explicit incentives (compensation parameters) and implicit incentives (career concerns). Explicit incentives are reduced as career concerns become more salient.innovation, new product development, authority, incentives, resource allocation, portfolio