Developing the "right" new products is critical to firm success and is often cited as a key competitive dimension. This paper explores new product development (NPD) portfolio strategy and the balance between incremental and radical innovation. We characterize innovative effort through a normative theoretical framework that addresses a popular practice in NPD portfolio management: the use of strategic buckets. Strategic buckets encourage the division of the overall NPD resource budget into smaller, more focused budgets that are defined by the type of innovative effort (incremental or radical). We show that time commitment determines the balance between incremental and radical innovation. When managers execute this balance, they are often confounded by (i) environmental complexity, defined as the number of unknown interdependencies among technology and market parameters that determine product performance; and (ii) environmental instability, the probability of changes to the underlying performance functions. Although both of these factors confound managers, we find that they have completely opposite effects on the NPD portfolio balance. Environmental complexity shifts the balance toward radical innovation. Conversely, environmental instability shifts the balance toward incremental innovation. Risk considerations and implications for theory and practice are also discussed.new product development, NPD portfolio strategy, incremental innovation, radical innovation, strategic buckets, complex systems, evolutionary systems
The first step in transforming strategy from a hopeful statement about the future into an operational reality is to allocate resources to innovation and new product development (NPD) programs in a portfolio. Resource allocation and NPD portfolio decisions often span multiple levels of the organization's hierarchy, leading to questions about how much authority to bestow on managers and how to structure incentives for NPD. In this study, we explore how funding authority and incentives affect a manager's allocation of resources between existing product improvement (relatively incremental projects) and new product development (more radical projects). Funding may be either fixed or variable depending on the extent to which the manager has the authority to use revenue derived from existing product sales to fund NPD efforts. We find that the use of variable funding drives higher effort toward improving existing products and developing new products. However, variable funding has a subtle side effect: it induces the manager to focus on existing product improvement to a greater degree than new product development, and the relative balance in the NPD portfolio shifts toward incremental innovation. In addition, we highlight a substitution effect between explicit incentives (compensation parameters) and implicit incentives (career concerns). Explicit incentives are reduced as career concerns become more salient.innovation, new product development, authority, incentives, resource allocation, portfolio
M ost organizations employ collaborative teams to manage innovation projects. Although the use of collaborative innovation teams is a good starting point, an organization's ability to innovate can be enhanced by managing risktaking behavior through monetary incentive schemes and through an organizational culture that tolerates failure. This article reports the results of two controlled experiments aimed at understanding how tolerance for failure and incentives impact the decisions of individuals engaged in a collaborative innovation initiative. A key element of our experiments is the notion of endogenous project risk, which we define as the explicit link between resources allocated to a project and the likelihood of project success. We observe that when penalties are low, the amount of risk an individual assumes is fairly insensitive to the rewards that are offered. In an analogous result, when individuals make decisions alone (rather than collaboratively), higher tolerance for failure does little to increase the amount of risk an individual is willing to take. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of implicit incentives that are created as a result of project and organizational characteristics.
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