Insight problem solving is characterized by impasses, states of mind in which the thinker does not know what to do next. The authors hypothesized that impasses are broken by changing the problem representation, and 2 hypothetical mechanisms for representational change are described: the relaxation of constraints on the solution and the decomposition of perceptual chunks. These 2 mechanisms generate specific predictions about the relative difficulty of individual problems and about differential transfer effects. The predictions were tested in 4 experiments using matchstick arithmetic problems. The results were consistent with the predictions. Representational change is a more powerful explanation for insight than alternative hypotheses, if the hypothesized change processes are specified in detail. Overcoming impasses in insight is a special case of the general need to override the imperatives of past experience in the face of novel conditions. Experience is both a help and a hindrance. On the one hand, human beings have no choice but to consider each new situation, task, or problem in light of past experience. There is no other resource for understanding the present and anticipating the future. On the other hand, life is complex, and there is no guarantee that tomorrow will be like yesterday. Past experience is necessarily misleading part of the time. Problem solving often unfolds in a way that reflects the need to overcome the imperatives of past experience. The thinker begins by exploring the approaches to the problem

Four experiments examined whether verbalization can interfere with insight problem solving. In Experiment 1, Ss were interrupted during problem solving and asked either to verbalize their strategies (retrospective verbalization) or engage in an unrelated activity (control). Ss in the retrospective verbalization condition were significantly less successful than control subjects at solving the problems. Experiment 2 replicated the finding of Experiment 1 and demonstrated that the control Ss' advantage was not due to any beneficial effect of the interruption. In Experiment 3, concurrent, nondirective verbalization impaired the solving of insight problems but had no effect on noninsight problems. In Experiment 4, the effect of concurrent verbalization on insight was maintained even when Ss were encouraged to consider alternative approaches. Together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that verbalization can result in the disruption of nonreportable processes that are critical to achieving insight solutions.Although thought processes often closely correspond to the contents of inner speech (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984Sokolov, 1972;Vygotsky, 1934Vygotsky, /1989, certain thoughts have a distinctly nonverbal character. A long tradition of scholars have suggested that creative thoughts, and in particular "insights" (problem solutions that occur unexpectedly following an impasse), are distinct from language processes (e.g.

The representational change theory of insight claims that insight problems cause impasses because they mislead problem solvers into constructing inappropriate initial representations. Insight is attained when the initial representation is changed. In the present study (N = 24), we tested three specific implications of these hypotheses against eye movements recorded while participants solved matchstick arithmetic problems. The results were consistent with the predictions, providing converging evidence with prior findings using solution rates and solution times. Alternative theories of insight can explain individual findings, but only the representational change theory accounts for both the performance data and the eye movement data. The present study also suggests that eye movement recordings provide an important new window into processes of insight problem solving.

A theory of how people detect and correct their own performance errors during skill practice is proposed. The basic principles of the theory are that errors are caused by overly general knowledge structures, that error detection requires domain-specific declarative knowledge, that errors are experienced as conflicts between what the learner believes ought to be true and what he or she perceives to be the case, and that errors are corrected by specializing faulty knowledge structures so that they become active only in situations in which they are appropriate. A computer simulation model that embodies the theory learns cognitive skills in ecologically valid domains. The theory generates novel and testable predictions about error correction. It is also consistent with learning phenomena that are seemingly unrelated to errors, including transfer of training and the learning curve.People acquire skills through practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). To be ready to practice, the learner must possess some initial competence. Exercising the initial competence by repeatedly attempting to perform a novel task engenders increased competence and, eventually, mastery, even in the absence of instruction. Discovering the cognitive mechanism behind this mental bootstrapping act has been a central goal for the psychology of learning for a century (

Theories of insight problems are often tested by formulating hypotheses about the particular difficulties of individual insight problems. Such evaluations often implicitly assume that there is a single difficulty. We argue that the quantitatively small effects of many studies arise because the difficulty of many insight problems is determined by multiple factors, so the removal of 1 factor has limited effect on the solution rate. Difficulties can reside either in problem perception, in prior knowledge, or in the processing of the problem information. We support this multiple factors perspective through 3 experiments on the 9-dot problem (N.R.F. Maier, 1930). Our results lead to a significant reformulation of the classical hypothesis as to why this problem is difficult. The results have general implications for our understanding of insight problem solving and for the interpretation of data from studies that aim to evaluate hypotheses about the sources of difficulty of particular insight problems.