We present a dynamic labour demand model where we evaluate the impact of employment regulations on permanent and temporary employment. We consider three different kinds of regulations, namely firing costs, hiring costs and a constraint on temporary contracts. These regulations differently affect the size and composition of employment. The theoretical results are interpreted and questioned on the basis of empirical evidence on the employment effects of the regulation reforms that occurred in the major European countries in the period 1983–1999. The empirical analysis is based on a new set of time‐varying indicators on permanent employment protection, fixed‐term contracts and temporary agency work regulations. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that fixed‐term contracts have been effective stepping‐stones to permanent jobs during the period under observation. On the contrary, flexible temporary agency work regulations seem to induce a substitution of permanent with temporary contracts.

In this paper we aim to remedy some shortcomings in the economic literature on university student absenteeism and academic performance. We start by introducing a simple theoretical model in which students decide the optimal allocation of their time between lecture attendance, self-study and leisure. Under some specific assumptions, we find a positive relationship between lecture attendance and time devoted to self-study in each course, from which we infer that estimates of student performance regressions which omit self-study might be biased. Thus, we estimate an academic performance regression using data from first year undergraduate students of economics in the academic year 1998-99 at the University of Ancona (Italy) and find evidence that once self-study time is controlled for, the positive and significant effect of lecture attendance for some courses disappears. This is likely to be important especially when student performance regressions are used to evaluate the effectiveness of course attendance and to inform the debate on the introduction of mandatory attendance on some courses to enhance student performance.

Summary We study the effect of childbirth and birth timing on female labor market outcomes in Italy. The impact is traced up to 21 years since school completion by estimating a factor analytic model with dynamic selection into treatments. We find that childbirth, especially the first delivery, negatively affects female earnings and participation. Women having their first child soon after school exit catch up with childless women after 12–15 years. The negative consequences are smaller if the first child is delayed up to 7–9 years after school completion or if a second childbirth occurs within 6 years since school exit.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the probability of being a teleworker and the extent of earnings differentials between teleworkers and traditional employees. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is grounded on a theoretical framework depicting endogenous telework assignment and wage variations based on individual bargaining. The empirical strategy allows for non-random telework assignment, generating from individual- and job-specific observed as well as unobserved factors. Findings Results are based on the Italian labor force survey and uncover a key role of gender, higher education and family composition as determinants of the probability of teleworking. Furthermore, teleworkers enjoy a wage premium ranging between 2.7 and 8 percent. Originality/value Accounting for observed individual and job-specific effects, by both standard linear regression and propensity score matching, largely reduces the extent of wage premium emerging from unconditional descriptives; the results of an endogenous switching regression model however suggest that failing to properly care for unobserved factors leads to the underestimation of returns to telework.

This paper analyses both theoretically and empirically the effects of immigration on the wage rate of native workers. There is rare evidence in empirical literature that immigration generates a fall in the wages of manual workers. By hypothesizing an economic system where advanced firms buy an intermediate good from traditional firms, which employ manual workers in both clean and dirty tasks, the latter being more disliked by native workers, we present a theoretical model that justifies these results. We conclude that native skilled wages always increase whereas native unskilled wages can both increase or decrease with immigration. An empirical analysis of the Italian labour market follows, showing that native workers' wages always rise with immigration. Copyright 2010 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.