No abstract

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2005.

No abstract

AbstraetTu ovcrcome deficils 01 lhe Lindahl solulion concepl when lhe econlJl1ly does nol exhibil conslanl relurns lo scale. Kaneko (1977a) introduced lhe concepl (lf a ratio equilibriulII. The ratio cOl'l'e.l'pOllllellCe sdects for each economy its sel 01' ralio equilibrium allocations. In Ihis papcr we provide a simple markel game lhal double illll'lel//t'nts lhe ratio con'espondence in Nash and strong equilibria.

No abstract