Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Wilkie, Simon

doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2005.00342.x

Cited by 90 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 28 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We extend the voluntary participation game in such a way that agents can freely exchange their endowments of the private good, based on the model of Jackson and Wilkie (2005). We show that at the equilibrium in this model, the voluntary transfer scheme does not always achieve s-Pareto efficiency.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Provision of Public Goods that are Complements for Private Goods: Application to Open Source Software Developments

Matsushima

Shinohara

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper examines the questions of who participates in the provision of a public good through the voluntary participation of agents in the presence of strong complementarity between a public good and a private good. We show that the greater the initial endowment of the private good that agents have, the more likely they are to participate in the provision of the public good. Whether an agent participates does not depend on the efficiency of his/her technology for production of the public good. We extend the basic model and introduce a simple transfer game. We show a sufficient condition so that the voluntary transfer scheme achieves Pareto efficiency.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Provision of Public Goods that are Complements for Private Goods: Application to Open Source Software Developments

Matsushima

Shinohara

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…First, the persona framework can be used to model a variant of games of contingent commitments (Kalai et al, 2008;Jackson and Wilkie, 2005;Myerson, 1991). Games of contingent commitments consist of two steps, just as in the persona framework.…”

Section: Other Applications Of the Persona Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Games of binding commitments may also involve a first stage in which the players commit not to play some of their possible pure strategies, and honestly signal those commitments to one another (Renou, 2008;Jackson and Wilkie, 2005). These games can be seen as a special case of persona games in which the personas a i in the set of player i consist of "masked" versions of u i , where the forsworn pure strategies are given negative infinite utility: a i (x) = u i (x) if x i X i ⊂ X i , and a i (x) = −∞ otherwise.…”

Section: Other Applications Of the Persona Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Choice of Preferences: The Persona Model

Wolpert

Jamison

Harré³

2010

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We introduce a modification to the two-timescale games studied in the evolution of preferences (EOP) literature. In this modification, the strategic process occurring on the long timescale is learning by an individual across his or her lifetime, not natural selection operating on genomes over multiple generations. This change to the longer timescale removes many of the formal difficulties of EOP models and allows us to show how two-timescale games can provide endogenous explanations for why humans sometimes adopt interdependent preferences and sometimes exhibit logit quantal response functions. In particular, we show that our modification to EOP explains experimental data in the Traveler's Dilemma. We also use our modification to show how cooperation can arise in nonrepeated versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). We then show that our modification to EOP predicts a "crowding out" phenomenon in the PD, in which introducing incentives to cooperate causes players to stop cooperating instead. We also use our modification to predict a tradeoff between the robustness and the benefit of cooperation in the PD. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

show abstract

“…In addition, in one-way games, players do not have complete information, and moves are simultaneous. Jackson and Wilkie [5] studied one-way instances derived from their more general framework of endogenous games. However, they tackled the problem from a different perspective and assumed complete information (i.e., the player utilities are not private).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games

Abeliuk

Berbeglia

Hentenryck

2015

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without side payments and the social cost of any ex post efficient mechanism can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational and efficient. To address this negative result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism based on a single-offer bargaining made by the dependent player that leverages the intrinsic advantage of the independent player. In this setting the outside option of the dependent player is not known a priori; however, we show that the mechanism satisfies individual rationality conditions, is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced and produces an outcome that is more efficient than the equilibrium without * An earlier, shorter version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2015 [1].Games 2015, 6 348 payments. Finally, we show that a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit in terms of efficiency.

show abstract

Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Cited by 90 publications

References 28 publications

Private Provision of Public Goods that are Complements for Private Goods: Application to Open Source Software Developments

Private Provision of Public Goods that are Complements for Private Goods: Application to Open Source Software Developments

Strategic Choice of Preferences: The Persona Model

Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About