O papel das instituições formais e informais na economia das organizações é tradicionalmente analisado em termos dos mecanismos eficientes de governança que minimizam os custos de transação. Baseada numa perspectiva inversa, a presente pesquisa foca nas falhas de coordenação e no problema da falta de garantias nas transações econômicas. Especificamente, examina-se o conjunto de garantias que suportam a transação entre pecuaristas e a indústria frigorífica em Mato Grosso do Sul com foco nas ineficiências do processo de comercialização de gado para abate. Para a compreensão das falhas de coordenação, propõe-se um constructo teórico baseado em Barzel (1997), que relaciona direitos de propriedade, garantias e instituições. Esse modelo é testado empiricamente por meio do desenvolvimento de duas regressões logísticas múltiplas: i) modelo logit ordenado baseado na percepção de risco dos pecuaristas e ii) modelo probit bivariado recursivo baseado na percepção de risco dos pecuaristas e no papel das ações coletivas. Os resultados apontam para a importância das instituições formais e das ações coletivas como mecanismos geradores de garantias para a transação e, consequentemente, para a minimização dos custos de transação.
The role of formal and informal institutions in the economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize transaction costs. Based on a different perspective, this paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. In particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees which supports the transaction between producers and the meatpacking industry in the Mato Grosso do Sul state regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of ready-to-slaughter animals. A theoretical model based on Barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and institutions is proposed for the understanding of coordination failures. This model is empirically tested with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit model based on the producer's risk perception and ii) a recursive bivariate probit model based on producer's risk perception and on the role of collective action. The findings suggest that formal institutions and collective actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and, thus, representing a source of transaction costs minimization

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influencing factors on cattle breeders’ payment system choices using cross-sectional data collected in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Rio Grande do Sul. The investigation aims to analyze the problem of value appropriation comparing the payment based on carcass index with live weight mode under the perspective of “bovine for slaughtering” as a multidimensional product with various attributes. Design/methodology/approach This study employs a generalized order logistic regression model in a survey with 69 cattle breeders’ interview to conduct the empirical analysis. Findings The empirical results show that measurement difficulties and collective actions influence farmers’ choice to a less efficient payment system in quality terms and value appropriation problems, while the trust level in the slaughterhouse pushes to a more efficient system. Furthermore, trust was presented as more important than technological aspects and long-time relationship as well as collective action corroborates to increase bargaining power and to solve conflicts. In sum, trust, measurement and bargaining power brought traditional and alternative solutions to solve conflicts such as well-designed payment indicators, collective actions and transaction costs. Originality/value This study used first-hand survey and proxy variables on cattle farmers’ payment system choices. Another contribution is the focus on two regions with two different payment systems in the same institutional environment in a way to suggest mechanisms of private strategies and public policy to reduce opportunistic value appropriation as well as decreasing conflict.

No abstract

Despite the practice of open innovation being consolidated, scientific publications are still limited, particularly when related to agribusiness. Through bibliometric technique and content analysis, this study aimed to analyze the state of the art on the subject, explaining the development of open innovation in agribusiness and highlight future research opportunities. The risk of sharing valuable knowledge is the main barrier to adoption. For mitigate it, there is a need for internal organizational changes, the support of communication tools and an intellectual property model that encourage knowledge sharing. Open innovation is a field that needs to be explored in different links in the chain, locations and contexts, in order to help ensure that organizations can benefit from this strategy.

No abstract

Background: Organizational failure in food markets is a potential threat to food security. Thus, a greater understanding of the factors that influence organizational failure and reduce supply chain resilience is essential to underpin agile and dynamic food supply chains. Scope and Approach:The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of system level factors that influence organizational failure in food supply chains in order to conceptualize the horizontal and vertical interaction of such factors at the three levels described: the microsystem, the mesosystem and the macrosystem level. A systematic review incorporated articles from the fields of management, business and economics research. Whilst 616 articles were initially identified, only 41 of these were within the established inclusion criteria and reviewed. A model of organizational failure, determined here as "The House of Cards Model", is developed, that can then be empirically tested in further research. Key findings and conclusions:A hierarchy was developed to contextualize the factors deemed to be of influence. The macro (external environment) level includes criteria such as economic conditions, formal institutions, government policies, competitors and rumors. The factors addressed in the meso (organizational) level include organization age and size, location, property structure, client, supplier and shareholder relationships, financial resources, physical resources, human resources and succession process. At the micro (individual) level the managers' skill, characteristics, actions and mindset are of influence. This paper contributes to advancing the debate and underpins further empirical research on organizational failure in food supply chains.

No abstract

Notes: (*) Case 2007.006092-8/0001.00 (April, 16 th , 2007) presents a full description of the fraudulent relationship between three meatpacking firms (Frigorífico Bonifácio Ltda., Frigorífico Boi Verde Alimentos Ltda. and Frigorífico Boi do Centro Oeste) where owners make use of partners to cover up tax debts and commit acts which can potentially harm farmers. Should I go to court? An assessment of the role of the Judiciary in disputes between cattle raisers and meatpackers in BrazilThe main objective of this perspective paper is to analyze the role of the judiciary in resolving conflicts between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms in Brazil. Looking at the transaction for the acquisition of cattle for slaughter in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (the central-western region of Brazil), the analysis encompasses three steps. First, the authors describe the transaction pattern between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms, identifying a guarantee vacuum within the supply chain. Secondly, the authors present evidence that the guarantee vacuum may give rise to legal conflicts of non-payment, which are indeed prevalent in disputes that reach the courts. Finally, the role of the judiciary in resolving these conflicts is investigated. Results suggest that, on average, producers have little confidence in the legal system, indicating the potential function that informal mechanisms may play in the supply chain. The paper concludes by suggesting some implications for public and private strategies.