O presente ensaio parte da pergunta da razão explicativa para o limitado uso do enfoque contratual para o estudo das firmas na Economia Agrícola no Brasil. Discute a relevância dos contratos para o avanço da teoria da firma, apresenta uma evolução dos enfoques aplicados ao estudo da coordenação de sistemas agroindustriais no Brasil e em centros internacionais e finaliza apresentando uma agenda de pesquisa e ensino para a Economia Aplicada em geral e Economia Agrícola em particular.
This essay departs from the question about the limited adoption of the contractual approach in the field of Agricultural Economics in Brazil. It discusses the relevance of the contractual approach to the theory of the firm, presents the evolution of the studies of coordination in food chains in Brazil and abroad, and concludes suggesting a research and educational agenda for applied Agricultural Economics

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Effective governance of cooperatives depends on the pro‐active participation of members in the governance. However, it is commonly argued that, especially in cooperatives with high heterogeneity of membership, additional decision‐making and influencing costs could emerge if members who participate in the governance do so to obtain direct or indirect economic benefits at the individual farm level. The objective of this paper is to assess whether or not farmers’ economic motivations for continued association are relevant drivers of pro‐active participation. Data originate from 148 farmers from a large agricultural cooperative in Brazil. The results suggest that economic motivations for continued association are drivers of participation in the General Assembly, but not of ‘pro‐active’ participation in boards and committees.

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Organizational economics points to the weaknesses of cooperatives in producing high‐quality products compared with investor‐owned firms (IOFs). In the Brazilian broiler industry, suppliers delivering to a cooperative are performing better on quality than suppliers to an IOF. Data was collected through a survey among suppliers of one cooperative and two IOFs. What could explain the cooperative's advantage in terms of suppliers' quality performance? Results show that there are important differences regarding relationship characteristics such as dependence, behavioral uncertainty, market risk reduction, and adaptation support, which could account for the higher quality products of the cooperative farmers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

O papel das instituições formais e informais na economia das organizações é tradicionalmente analisado em termos dos mecanismos eficientes de governança que minimizam os custos de transação. Baseada numa perspectiva inversa, a presente pesquisa foca nas falhas de coordenação e no problema da falta de garantias nas transações econômicas. Especificamente, examina-se o conjunto de garantias que suportam a transação entre pecuaristas e a indústria frigorífica em Mato Grosso do Sul com foco nas ineficiências do processo de comercialização de gado para abate. Para a compreensão das falhas de coordenação, propõe-se um constructo teórico baseado em Barzel (1997), que relaciona direitos de propriedade, garantias e instituições. Esse modelo é testado empiricamente por meio do desenvolvimento de duas regressões logísticas múltiplas: i) modelo logit ordenado baseado na percepção de risco dos pecuaristas e ii) modelo probit bivariado recursivo baseado na percepção de risco dos pecuaristas e no papel das ações coletivas. Os resultados apontam para a importância das instituições formais e das ações coletivas como mecanismos geradores de garantias para a transação e, consequentemente, para a minimização dos custos de transação.
The role of formal and informal institutions in the economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize transaction costs. Based on a different perspective, this paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. In particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees which supports the transaction between producers and the meatpacking industry in the Mato Grosso do Sul state regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of ready-to-slaughter animals. A theoretical model based on Barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and institutions is proposed for the understanding of coordination failures. This model is empirically tested with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit model based on the producer's risk perception and ii) a recursive bivariate probit model based on producer's risk perception and on the role of collective action. The findings suggest that formal institutions and collective actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and, thus, representing a source of transaction costs minimization

The theory of the firm arose from the production function paradigm and amplified its scope to comprise both coordination between firms and their internal organization. The transaction cost perspective motivated a large number of empirical studies based on quasi-rents appropriation resulting from asset specific investments. Another theoretical approach to the firm-likewise rooted in the transaction cost perspective-is the measurement cost theory, which has not had an equivalent empirical impact. Both theories share similar grounds but differ in terms of internal logic, explicit assumptions and key measurable variables, which suggests methodological implications. The aim of this paper is to contrast both theories, discussing their theoretical and empirical boundaries. Following the introduction, the second part contrasts the theoretical constructs. The third part suggests testable hypotheses and predictions. Part 4 presents a case of contradictory interpretation of similarly observed phenomena, using both lenses. Finally, Part 5 concludes.

In this study, we examine the costs of democratic control, an important factor affecting the competitiveness of traditional agricultural cooperatives. Although there has been some theoretical discussion about this issue, no empirical research has been done on these costs; the present study aims to bridge this gap. Following the literature, the main source of democratic costs in agricultural cooperatives is the level of member participation in cooperative governance. We have developed more specific theoretical insights about this special kind of decision-making cost by showing the effect of differences in the level of member participation on democratic costs, differences in terms of democratic and influence costs and in terms of agency costs, and differences between both direct and opportunity democratic costs. Members should take both the relative direct and opportunity costs within total democratic costs into account when determining the optimal size and composition of their board.