Findings in the social psychology literatures on attitudes, social perception, and emotion demonstrate that social information processing involves embodiment, where embodiment refers both to actual bodily states and to simulations of experience in the brain's modality-specific systems for perception, action, and introspection. We show that embodiment underlies social information processing when the perceiver interacts with actual social objects (online cognition) and when the perceiver represents social objects in their absence (offline cognition). Although many empirical demonstrations of social embodiment exist, no particularly compelling account of them has been offered. We propose that theories of embodied cognition, such as the Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) account (Barsalou, 1999), explain and integrate these findings, and that they also suggest exciting new directions for research. We compare the PSS account to a variety of related proposals and show how it addresses criticisms that have previously posed problems for the general embodiment approach.

The belief that, in school, success only depends on will and hard work is widespread in Western societies despite evidence showing that several factors other than merit explain school success, including group belonging (e.g., social class, gender). In the present paper, we argue that because merit is the only track for low status students to reach upward mobility, Belief in School Meritocracy (BSM) is a particularly useful system-justifying tool to help them perceive their place in society as being deserved. Consequently, for low status students (but not high status students), this belief should be related to more general system-justifying beliefs (Study 1). Moreover, low status students should be particularly prone to endorsing this belief when their place within a system on which they strongly depend to acquire status is challenged (Study 2). In Study 1, high status (boys and high SES) were compared to low status (girls and low SES) high school students. Results indicated that BSM was related to system-justifying beliefs only for low SES students and for girls, but not for high SES students or for boys. In Study 2, university students were exposed (or not) to information about an important selection process that occurs at the university, depending on the condition. Their subjective status was assessed. Although such a confrontation reduced BSM for high subjective SES students, it tended to enhance it for low subjective SES students. Results are discussed in terms of system justification motives and the palliative function meritocratic ideology may play for low status students.

Happy, sad, or neutral participants evaluated the likelihood of a suspect’s guilt. The suspect’s membership was or was not stereotypically associated with the misconduct of which he was accused. Participants also were provided with specific case information that varied in its implications (ambiguous implying either the suspect’s guilt or innocence). The results show that when stereotypes clearly contradict specific information, happy people rely on the latter and no longer use stereotypes. The general assumption of a greater reliance on stereotypes under happiness was found to be restricted to “slight inconsistency.” Overall, this study supports the mood-and-general-knowledge (MAGK) model. In contrast, even though sadness decreases reliance on stereotypes, it does not increase careful processing of incoming information, as is generally assumed in the literature.

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We examined how the framing of responsibility for reducing socio‐economic inequality affects individuals' emotional reactions towards the poor and the willingness to engage in prosocial actions. Attribution of responsibility to either the system (government and institutions), the less deprived in‐group, or the disadvantaged out‐group (poor) was measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, moral outrage was higher than collective guilt when system responsibility for inequalities was put forth, but collective guilt arose to reach the level of moral outrage when in‐group responsibility was emphasized. Moreover, distinguishing between collective guilt for action and for inaction, we found guilt for inaction more difficult and thus less likely to arise, unless responsibility was put on the in‐group. Collective emotions were also found to be negatively linked to system justification motivation illustrating the palliative function of legitimization processes. Finally, moral outrage predicted the willingness to act upon socio‐economic inequalities both when the system's and in‐group's responsibility was emphasized, whereas collective guilt for action (but not for inaction) predicted support for prosocial actions only when the in‐group's responsibility was engaged. These findings suggest that the specific group‐based emotions in response to poverty depend on whether the system or the in‐group is held responsible and differentially predict individuals' commitment to act.

This study explores the way groups cope with collective responsibility for ecological problems. The social representations approach was adopted, and the collective symbolic coping model was used as a frame of analysis, integrating collective emotions to enhance the understanding of coping processes. The original feature of this study is that the analysis is at group level. Seven focus groups were conducted with French students. An original use of focus groups was proposed: Discussions were structured to induce feelings of collective responsibility and enable observation of how groups cope with such feelings at various levels (social knowledge; social identities; group dynamics). Two analyses were conducted: Qualitative analysis of participants' use of various kinds of knowledge, social categories and the group dynamics, and lexicometric analysis to reveal how emotions varied during the different discussion phases. Results showed that groups' emotional states moved from negative to positive: They used specific social categories and resorted to shared stereotypes to cope with collective responsibility and maintain the integrity of their worldview. Only then did debate become possible again; it was anchored in the nature-culture dichotomy such that groups switched from group-based to system-based emotions.

Based on system‐justification theory, we hypothesized that men and women would perform in accordance with gender stereotypes mainly when justification of the system is necessary. In this research, system‐justification motivation was triggered using a system‐dependency manipulation. Study 1 shows that when feeling highly (vs. less) dependent on the system, people endorsed system‐justifying beliefs more. In Study 2, men performed better in math than in verbal domains, while women showed the reverse pattern, but only when they felt highly dependent on the system. Similar results were obtained on performance self‐evaluation. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The present study examined narratives about situations in which individuals experience physical and/or moral disgust, and the similarities and differences between them. A thematic content analysis of participants' narratives of personal physically or morally disgusting experiences as well as a lexical analysis using the computer program ALCESTE revealed that physical disgust emerges in an instantaneous reflex-like way during situations in which the individual is directly exposed to physical disgust elicitors. Physically disgusting events are described from an actor's perspective and induce predominantly 'pure' disgust in the absence of other negative emotions. Furthermore, physical disgust, which strongly involves sensory modalities such as vision, odor, touch and taste, leads to more bodily reactions (e.g. nausea, tremor) and impels avoidance behavior. Morally disgusting events relate primarily to the observation of others as the victims of violence, betrayal and injustice (observer perspective), and involve judgments and reflections about the event, suggesting more in-depth cognitive elaboration. Morally disgusting events were found also to induce other negative emotions, such as anger and sadness. Our results suggest that these two types of disgust are sufficiently distinct to anticipate that they might differentially affect individuals' social and moral judgments. Keywords ALCESTE, content analysis, moral and social judgment, physical and moral disgust RésuméCette étude a examiné des récits de situations dans lesquelles les individus ressentent du dégoût physique et/ou moral et les similitudes et différences entre ces deux types de dégoût. Une analyse de contenu thématique des récits, ainsi qu'une analyse lexicale à l'aide du logiciel ALCESTE a révélé que le dégoût physique survient de manière instantanée dans des situations dans lesquelles l'individu est directement exposé aux inducteurs du dégoût physique. Les événements physiquement dégoûtants sont davantage relatés selon une perspective d'acteur et induisent principalement un dégoût 'pur' en l'absence d'autres émotions négatives. De plus, le dégoût physique, qui implique fortement des modalités sensorielles comme la vision, l'odorat, le toucher et le goût, conduit davantage à des manifestations corporelles (nausées, tremblements, etc.) et incite aux comportements d'évitement. En revanche, les événements moralement dégoutants portent principalement sur l'observation des autres comme victimes de violence, de trahison et d'injustice (perspective d'observateur) et impliquent des jugements et des réflexions sur la situation, suggérant une élaboration cognitive plus approfondie. Les événements moralement répugnants se sont aussi avérés induire d'autres émotions négatives, telles que la colère et la tristesse. Nos résultats suggèrent que ces deux types de dégoût sont suffisamment distincts pour qu'ils puissent affecter différemment les jugements sociaux et moraux des individus. Mots-clés ALCESTE, analyse de contenu, dégoût physique et moral, jugement moral et s...