Humanitarian interventions (HIs) are a common aspect of US foreign policy. Policy makers acknowledge the importance of public support for interventions, but scholars remain divided about the extent and basis of that support. Using a series of survey experiments, we evaluate attitudes about HIs, assess whether the public supports these interventions for instrumental or moral reasons, and test which aspects of morality are most salient. The findings indicate that interventions addressing humanitarian crises boost public support, with the basis of that support residing primarily in normative contentions that the United States has a moral obligation to protect civilians. This research advances understandings of morality in foreign policy, mediates debates about the determinants of public attitudes—including when the public makes moral rather than prudent decisions about interventions—and has important policy implications. It suggests a morally motivated public may be more likely to support risky HIs, increasing the likelihood of using force.

Conventional wisdom assumes the best way to mobilize public support for military action is through the lens of national security. Humanitarian justifications provide a helpful substitute when US interests are not at stake, but are less reliable. However, US presidents have provided humanitarian explanations for every military intervention of the post-Cold War period. What, if any, power do humanitarian justifications have in security-driven interventions? The article answers this question by developing a domestic coalition framework that evaluates justifications in terms of whose support matters most in the build-up to intervention. Survey experiments demonstrate that humanitarian narratives are necessary to build the largest possible coalition of support. However, presidents risk backlash if they stretch humanitarian claims too far. Data from thirteen waves of Chicago Council surveys and an original dataset of justifications for US interventions confirm that humanitarian justifications are a common and politically relevant tool. The findings challenge both the folk realist expectation that the public responds primarily to threats to its own security and the constructivist tendency to limit the power of humanitarian justifications to cases of humanitarian intervention. Instead, humanitarian justifications are equally, if not more, important than security explanations for mobilizing domestic support, even in security-driven interventions.

Presidents have significant incentives to mislead the public about the use of force. Under what conditions are members of the public willing to hold presidents accountable for what they say about military action? This article examines both spin and deceit at the micro-level to clarify when individuals are most likely to punish presidents for misinformation. Three survey experiments demonstrate that presidents incur political costs for misinformation, even when operations succeed. Introducing partisanship into the analysis then reveals that not all individuals are equally likely to punish all presidents—Republican leaders primarily concerned with their base have the most leeway to mislead. The findings highlight the dynamic nature of democratic accountability and domestic constraints on military force. Rather than a static institutional feature, the strength of accountability can vary across presidents and electoral coalitions. Additionally, the results show political costs are not limited to large-scale deception—even spin generates backlash.

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