African swine fever (ASF) is a devastating haemorrhagic fever of pigs with mortality rates approaching 100 per cent. It causes major economic losses, threatens food security and limits pig production in affected countries. ASF is caused by a large DNA virus, African swine fever virus (ASFV). There is no vaccine against ASFV and this limits the options for disease control. ASF has been confined mainly to sub-Saharan Africa, where it is maintained in a sylvatic cycle and/or among domestic pigs. Wildlife hosts include wild suids and arthropod vectors. The relatively small numbers of incursions to other continents have proven to be very difficult to eradicate. Thus, ASF remained endemic in the Iberian peninsula until the mid-1990s following its introductions in 1957 and 1960 and the disease has remained endemic in Sardinia since its introduction in 1982. ASF has continued to spread within Africa to previously uninfected countries, including recently the Indian Ocean islands of Madagascar and Mauritius. Given the continued occurrence of ASF in sub-Saharan Africa and increasing global movements of people and products, it is not surprising that further transcontinental transmission has occurred. The introduction of ASF to Georgia in the Caucasus in 2007 and dissemination to neighbouring countries emphasizes the global threat posed by ASF and further increases the risks to other countries. We review the mechanisms by which ASFV is maintained within wildlife and domestic pig populations and how it can be transmitted. We then consider the risks for global spread of ASFV and discuss possibilities of how disease can be prevented.

Transboundary animal diseases can have very severe socio-economic impacts when introduced into new regions. The history of disease incursions into the European Union suggests that initial outbreaks were often initiated by illegal importation of meat and derived products. The European Union would benefit from decision-support tools to evaluate the risk of disease introduction caused by illegal imports in order to inform its surveillance strategy. However, due to the difficulty in quantifying illegal movements of animal products, very few studies of this type have been conducted. Using African swine fever as an example, this work presents a novel risk assessment framework for disease introduction into the European Union through illegal importation of meat and products. It uses a semi-quantitative approach based on factors that likely influence the likelihood of release of contaminated smuggled meat and products, and subsequent exposure of the susceptible population. The results suggest that the European Union is at non-negligible risk of African swine fever introduction through illegal importation of pork and products. On a relative risk scale with six categories from negligible to very high, five European Union countries were estimated at high (France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom) or moderate (Spain) risk of African swine fever release, five countries were at high risk of exposure if African swine fever were released (France, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain) and ten countries had a moderate exposure risk (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom). The approach presented here and results obtained for African swine fever provide a basis for the enhancement of risk-based surveillance systems and disease prevention programmes in the European Union.

The recent incursion and spread of African swine fever virus (ASFV) in the Russian Federation and Caucasus region, close to European Union (EU) borders, have increased the concerns regarding the probability of ASFV introduction into the EU. There are many potential routes of ASFV entry into EU, but here we specifically aimed to assess the probability of ASFV introduction by legal trade of pigs, which historically has been one of the most important ways of exotic diseases introduction into the EU. A stochastic model was used to estimate the monthly probability of ASFV introduction for each country of the EU. Results of this model suggest an annual probability for ASFV introduction in the whole EU by this way of 5.22*10(-3) , which approximately corresponds with one outbreak in 192years. The risk of ASFV introduction via live pigs was highest in Poland (69%), particularly during the months of November and December. As expected, Russian Federation is the country that most contributes to this risk, representing 68% of the overall annual risk. Methods and results presented here may be useful for informing risk-based surveillance and control programmes and, ultimately, for prevention and control of potential ASFV incursions into the EU.

The growing popularity of unpasteurized milk in the United States raises public health concerns. We estimated outbreak-related illnesses and hospitalizations caused by the consumption of cow’s milk and cheese contaminated with Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp., Listeria monocytogenes, and Campylobacter spp. using a model relying on publicly available outbreak data. In the United States, outbreaks associated with dairy consumption cause, on average, 760 illnesses/year and 22 hospitalizations/year, mostly from Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. Unpasteurized milk, consumed by only 3.2% of the population, and cheese, consumed by only 1.6% of the population, caused 96% of illnesses caused by contaminated dairy products. Unpasteurized dairy products thus cause 840 (95% CrI 611–1,158) times more illnesses and 45 (95% CrI 34–59) times more hospitalizations than pasteurized products. As consumption of unpasteurized dairy products grows, illnesses will increase steadily; a doubling in the consumption of unpasteurized milk or cheese could increase outbreak-related illnesses by 96%.

A cross-sectional study was carried out in 2005 and 2006 in three geographical areas of Madagascar to investigate and differentiate swine farm management and biosecurity practices in smallholder farming communities. Questionnaire data from a total of 709 pig farms were analysed using multiple factor analysis (MFA) and hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA). Variables describing management and biosecurity practices were organised into five groups: structure of the farm, animal-contacts, person- and vehicle-contacts, feeding, and sanitary aspects. In general, few biosecurity measures were implemented in the pig farms included in the study. Regional differences in management and biosecurity practices emerged from the MFA and were mainly due to, in order of decreasing importance: structure of the farm, sanitary aspects, feeding and animal-contacts and, to a lesser extent, person- and vehicle-contacts. HCA resulted in the differentiation of four distinct types of farms in each of two study areas, Arivonimamo and Marovoay, while no grouping could be identified amongst farms in Ambatondrazaka area. The characterisation of the different types of smallholder pig farms will allow adapting recommendations on husbandry practices and control measures in pig farms of these regions of Madagascar. The development of tailored recommendations is essential for Malagasy smallholders who have limited resources and need to make evidence-based management changes to reduce the risk of contagious diseases in their herds.

The expanding distribution of African swine fever (ASF) is threatening the pig industry worldwide. Most outbreaks occur in backyard and small-scale herds, where poor farmers often attempt to limit the disease’s economic consequences by the emergency sale of their pigs. The risk of African swine fever virus (ASFV) release via this emergency sale was investigated. Simulation modeling was used to study ASFV transmission in backyard and small-scale farms as well as the emergency sale of pigs, and the potential impact of improving farmers and traders’ clinical diagnosis ability–its timeliness and/or accuracy–was assessed. The risk of ASFV release was shown to be high, and improving farmers’ clinical diagnosis ability does not appear sufficient to effectively reduce this risk. Estimates obtained also showed that the distribution of herd size within the backyard and small-scale sectors influences the relative contribution of these farms to the risk of release of infected pigs. These findings can inform surveillance and control programs.

BackgroundThe recent occurrence and spread of African swine fever (ASF) in Eastern Europe is perceived as a serious risk for the pig industry in the European Union (EU). In order to estimate the potential risk of ASF virus (ASFV) entering the EU, several pathways of introduction were previously assessed separately. The present work aimed to integrate five of these assessments (legal imports of pigs, legal imports of products, illegal imports of products, fomites associated with transport and wild boar movements) into a modular tool that facilitates the visualization and comprehension of the relative risk of ASFV introduction into the EU by each analyzed pathway.ResultsThe framework’s results indicate that 48% of EU countries are at relatively high risk (risk score 4 or 5 out of 5) for ASFV entry for at least one analyzed pathway. Four of these countries obtained the maximum risk score for one pathway: Bulgaria for legally imported products during the high risk period (HRP); Finland for wild boar; Slovenia and Sweden for legally imported pigs during the HRP. Distribution of risk considerably differed from one pathway to another; for some pathways, the risk was concentrated in a few countries (e.g., transport fomites), whereas other pathways incurred a high risk for 4 or 5 countries (legal pigs, illegal imports and wild boar).ConclusionsThe modular framework, developed to estimate the risk of ASFV entry into the EU, is available in a public domain, and is a transparent, easy-to-interpret tool that can be updated and adapted if required. The model’s results determine the EU countries at higher risk for each ASFV introduction route, and provide a useful basis to develop a global coordinated program to improve ASFV prevention in the EU.

The recently published EAT-Lancet Commission report on dietary impacts on the environment suggested that their proposed diet could prevent more than 10 million annual premature mortalities from noncommunicable diseases globally. The report did not meet standards for transparency and replicability, nor did it fully account for statistical uncertainty. Our attempt to replicate the mortality calculations for the United States revealed flaws in the assumptions and methods used to estimate the avoided mortalities. After correcting some calculation errors and fully accounting for uncertainty in the avoided mortalities, the mortality reduction effect of the EAT-Lancet proposed diet in the USA is no greater than the impact of energy consumption changes that would prevent under-weight, over-weight, and obesity alone. As our findings call into question the global conclusions of the EAT-Lancet report, futher independent validation is needed before it can be used to inform dietary guidelines.