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ABSTRACT. In social-ecological systems, human activities and animal distribution are interrelated. Any effort at studying wildlife abundance therefore requires the integration of detailed socioeconomic context into species distribution models. Wild mammals have always been an important resource for humankind, and concepts of economic goods provide an analytical framework to deduce relevant socioeconomic factors that shape wild mammal-human relationships and consequences for the spatial distribution patterns of wild mammals. We estimated the effects of the human population on wild mammals in a rural area in the Republic of Guinea, West Africa. We related large mammal survey data via statistical models to detailed socioeconomic information about the human population in the same area. We compared models, taking account of the human population in different ways, and found that wild mammal abundance was better explained by human factors other than human population density. Although human population density had a negative effect on wild mammals, the effect of market integration and food taboos were more important and not accounted for by human population density alone. Additionally, the analysis did not provide evidence of higher mammal abundance in classified forests, which one would assume if conservation interventions aimed at reducing hunting were implemented. Beyond doubt, the relationship between humans and wild mammals is highly complex and species-and context-specific. To understand mammal-human relationships in the wider context of social-ecological systems, an in-depth knowledge of the socioeconomic characteristics of a human population is needed to identify crucial links and driving mechanisms.

The “transportability” of laboratory findings to other instances than the original implementation entails the robustness of rates of observed behaviors and estimated treatment effects to changes in the specific research setting and in the sample under study. In four studies based on incentivized games of fairness, trust, and reciprocity, we evaluate (1) the sensitivity of laboratory results to locally recruited student-subject pools, (2) the comparability of behavioral data collected online and, under varying anonymity conditions, in the laboratory, (3) the generalizability of student-based results to the broader population, and (4) with a replication at Amazon Mechanical Turk, the stability of laboratory results across research contexts. For the class of laboratory designs using incentivized games as measurement instruments of prosocial behavior, we find that rates of behavior and the exact behavioral differences between decision situations do not transport beyond specific implementations. Most clearly, data obtained from standard participant pools differ significantly from those from the broader population. This undermines the use of empirically motivated laboratory studies to establish descriptive parameters of human behavior. Directions of the behavioral differences between games, in contrast, are remarkably robust to changes in samples and settings. Moreover, we find no evidence for either anonymity effects nor mode effects potentially biasing laboratory measurement. These results underscore the capacity of laboratory experiments to establish generalizable causal effects in theory-driven designs.

Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prospect theory predicts differences between behavior in both domains. In this study, we experimentally analyze players’ behavior in dictator and ultimatum games when they need to divide a monetary loss and then compare this to behavior when players have to divide a monetary gain. We find that players treat gains and losses differently in that they are less generous in games over losses and react differently to prior experiences. Players in the dictator game become more selfish after they have had the experience of playing an ultimatum game first.

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