Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments

Berger, Roger; Rauhut, Heiko; Prade, Sandra; Helbing, Dirk

doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.09.009

Cited by 41 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Introducing bargaining over another "currency", i.e., over waiting time, reinforces previous results from standard ultimatum bargaining experiments (Berger et al, 2012), and creating stronger entitlements over the money by introducing a real-effort task shapes behavior in the predicted ways (Garcia-Gallego et al, 2008), as already mentioned above (section 3).…”

Section: Stakes and Entitlementssupporting

confidence: 82%

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Güth

Kocher²

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

328

202

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Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.Keywords: ultimatum bargaining, experiment, social preferences. JEL classification: C91 This version: 21 August 2013* When Güth presented the more recent ultimatum-like experiments, Uri Gneezy suggested writing a survey of more than 30 years of ultimatum bargaining research. We thank him for the nudge and David Bauder as well as Niklas Garnadt for excellent research assistance. We are extremely grateful to the magnificent members of the Economic Science Association Discussion List; many of them -too many to mention each by namepointed us to scholarly papers that use the ultimatum game. All remaining errors and omissions are of course ours. §

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Section: Stakes and Entitlementssupporting

confidence: 82%

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Güth

Kocher²

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

328

202

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…This more sophisticated assessment of fairness may be more typical of many real life social scenarios than the traditional UG and PD games. Indeed, it has been argued that participants in a typical UG may agree on an equal split simply because the stake is a “free gift” from the experimenter (Berger et al, 2012). Therefore taking into account the relative effort in relation to the reward obtained may have important implications for understanding cooperative behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma Depends on Players’ Contributions

et al. 2017

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Economic games such as the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) are widely used paradigms for studying fairness and cooperation. Monetary versions of these games involve two players splitting an arbitrary sum of money. In real life, however, people’s propensity to engage in cooperative behavior depends on their effort and contribution; factors that are well known to affect perceptions of fairness. We therefore sought to explore the impact of relative monetary contributions by players in the UG and PD. Adapted computerized UG and PD games, in which relative contributions from each player were manipulated, were administered to 200 participants aged 18–50 years old (50% female). We found that players’ contribution had large effects on cooperative behavior. Specifically, cooperation was greater amongst participants when their opponent had contributed more to joint earnings. This was manifested as higher acceptance rates and higher offers in the UG; and fewer defects in the PD compared to when the participant contributed more. Interestingly, equal contributions elicited the greatest sensitivity to fairness in the UG, and least frequent defection in the PD. Acceptance rates correlated positively with anxiety and sex differences were found in defection behavior. This study highlights the feasibility of computerized games to assess cooperative behavior and the importance of considering cooperation within the context of effortful contribution.

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“…Our experiment develops the setup of Berger et al further [31]. There, sharing money was replaced by waiting time to avoid windfall gains, but despite this and also various efforts to increase the anonymity of the social interaction, the experiment delivered experimental results that are consistent with the original UG.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…In the classical UG, two people have to share a certain amount of money provided by the experimenter, which in the literature is known as “the cake”. It has been argued that this could lead participants to agree on an equal split just because the cake is a free gift from the experimenter [31]. To avoid this form of ‘windfall gains’, Berger et al [31] required participants to wait for a certain amount of time before they could collect a constant payoff (the show-up pay) and asked them to decide how to split the waiting time.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game

2014

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Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.

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Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments

Cited by 41 publications

References 34 publications

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Cooperative Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma Depends on Players’ Contributions

Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game

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