As part of the future research agenda for presidency scholars, this article deals with two distinct but related issues: the first involves failed presidential decision making, particularly in the employment of prerogative power; the second involves the failure of interbranch collaborative decision making. Such study of failed presidential decision making is a topic of inquiry related to, but somewhat distinct from, the question of the "failed presidency" that has already engaged some presidency scholars. In some respects, presidential failures are the "black holes," the singularities of presidential studies-the usual laws of politics that apply to presidential "business as usual" seem not to apply inside the event horizon of fiascoes. Such research might help us to explain the paradoxes of the postmodern presidency: with greater institutional resources, with more delegated powers from Congress, and with (presumably) more accumulated experience from presidency scholarship, one might expect fewer rather than more spectacular failures.What do we want to know about the presidency? As part of the future research agenda for presidency scholars, I would suggest two distinct but related issues: the first involves failed presidential decision making, particularly in the employment of prerogative power; the second involves the failure of interbranch collaborative decision making.By presidential failure, I am referring here to the study of the kind of decisions that led John Kennedy to ask himself after the Bay of Pigs, "How could I have been so stupid?" Often these cases become defining moments for presidents: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam escalation, the Carter energy speech, the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Iran-Contra affair, Bush the elder's reversal on "read my lips, no new taxes," and the Clinton health care plan.The study of failed presidential decisions and policies is a topic of inquiry related to, but somewhat distinct from, the question of the "failed presidency" that has already engaged some presidency scholars. "They geld us first," Lyndon Johnson remarked in an interview he gave to David Brinkley after leaving office, "and then expect us to win the Kentucky Derby." 1 I take as a given the political weakness of the post-World War II presidency, weakness that has been accurately measured and assessed by a generation of scholars analyzing presidential 724 Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December)