Why Do Presidents Fail?

Abstract

As part of the future research agenda for presidency scholars, this article deals with two distinct but related issues: the first involves failed presidential decision making, particularly in the employment of prerogative power; the second involves the failure of interbranch collaborative decision making. Such study of failed presidential decision making is a topic of inquiry related to, but somewhat distinct from, the question of the "failed presidency" that has already engaged some presidency scholars. In some respects, presidential failures are the "black holes," the singularities of presidential studies-the usual laws of politics that apply to presidential "business as usual" seem not to apply inside the event horizon of fiascoes. Such research might help us to explain the paradoxes of the postmodern presidency: with greater institutional resources, with more delegated powers from Congress, and with (presumably) more accumulated experience from presidency scholarship, one might expect fewer rather than more spectacular failures.What do we want to know about the presidency? As part of the future research agenda for presidency scholars, I would suggest two distinct but related issues: the first involves failed presidential decision making, particularly in the employment of prerogative power; the second involves the failure of interbranch collaborative decision making.By presidential failure, I am referring here to the study of the kind of decisions that led John Kennedy to ask himself after the Bay of Pigs, "How could I have been so stupid?" Often these cases become defining moments for presidents: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam escalation, the Carter energy speech, the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Iran-Contra affair, Bush the elder's reversal on "read my lips, no new taxes," and the Clinton health care plan.The study of failed presidential decisions and policies is a topic of inquiry related to, but somewhat distinct from, the question of the "failed presidency" that has already engaged some presidency scholars. "They geld us first," Lyndon Johnson remarked in an interview he gave to David Brinkley after leaving office, "and then expect us to win the Kentucky Derby." 1 I take as a given the political weakness of the post-World War II presidency, weakness that has been accurately measured and assessed by a generation of scholars analyzing presidential 724 Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December)

Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development

“…One variant of this phenomenon can be found in the apparent paradox of the modern presidency: even as the president has amassed greater institutional resources than his nineteenth century forerunners, the modern president also appears more constrained than his predecessors in the face of other institutional actors confident in their constitutional roles and more vigilant in their efforts to defend them. 134 In addressing this question, future research might examine how changes in the structure of political competition, such as the role of political parties as mediating institutions, impact political barriers to entry in the United States. In congressional politics for example, scholars have shown that ballot access rules such as filing fees and petitions do erect political entry barriers and discourage competition.…”

Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional Office

“…Richard Pious in a 2002 article called “Why Do Presidents Fail?”—later expanded to a book in 2008—said it was time to revisit many of Neustadt's formulations, such as his distinction between the “amateur” president (Eisenhower) who first thinks of the public interest and his political stakes, and the “professional” (FDR) who defines the public interest in terms of his political advantage (Pious 2002; Pious 2008). In his book version, Pious says that Neustadt engaged in a “sleight of hand” by arguing that the president should define public policy “in terms of his own power stakes, because that is the professional way to develop the most viable public policy.” But why, Pious asked, would those he is attempting to persuade want to comply with a policy simply because it is in the president's personal interest?…”

“…In his book version, Pious says that Neustadt engaged in a “sleight of hand” by arguing that the president should define public policy “in terms of his own power stakes, because that is the professional way to develop the most viable public policy.” But why, Pious asked, would those he is attempting to persuade want to comply with a policy simply because it is in the president's personal interest? (Pious 2008, 262). Earlier, in 1984, Pious joined with Christopher Pyle to write an excellent study, The President, Congress, and the Constitution (Pyle and Pious 1984).…”

The LawBarackObama andCivilLiberties

“…They are crisis managers, not policy planners, and often find it necessary to devote more time to petty urgencies than to important matters, like restoring the rule of law. As crisis managers, presidents have little choice but to entrust enormous powers to people they hardly know, who will, in time, find it expedient to accept most of their agency's goals and confine reformist urges to a few select issues (Pious ).…”