Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics

Scholars interested in the power of the presidency often overlook the importance of a crisis. The right kind of event, however, has characteristics that create a window of opportunity for a president to exert or expand his unilateral power. Failure to explore this relationship leaves a gap in our knowledge regarding presidential power, which this article addresses. The results show foreign policy crises provide the largest window for a president to increase his authority. Economic crises and most natural disasters have little to no impact on unilateral power. Epidemic outbreaks are the exception, though compared to a foreign policy crisis, the impact is relatively small. Finally, the findings suggest a president suffering from institutional constraints or lacking in skill and will has the ability to increase his power whenever a foreign policy crisis occurs.

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises

Young

2013

“…On the magic of Hamilton's name, and under the high‐flying banner of the unitary executive, the commander in chief clause, and the assertion of inherent and plenary executive authority in foreign affairs, President Bush claimed unilateral presidential power to initiate preventive war, order acts of extraordinary rendition, authorize domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens, establish military tribunals, and suspend and terminate treaties, including the Geneva Conventions. The Bush administration, moreover, claimed the authority to “override” statutes that interfered with presidential policies and programs, and declared that the courts had no role to play in matters of war and peace and national security (Adler 2006, 2007; Fisher 2005a, 168‐261; Fisher 2007a; Miller 2008, 99‐228; Pfiffner 2008, 84‐247; Pious 2007; Savage 2007, 10‐331; Schwarz and Huq 2007, 65‐208).…”

Section: Hamilton and The Bush Theory Of Presidential Power In Foreigmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Law Presidential Power and Foreign Affairs in the Bush Administration: The Use and Abuse of Alexander Hamilton

Adler

2010

Alexander Hamilton's writings, virtually alone among the framers, were invoked by President George W. Bush and his legal advisors as the cornerstone of the administration's assertions of sweeping executive powers in the areas of war and peace and national security. The Bush administration's conscription of Hamilton to justify its soaring claims of presidential power, however, represents a distortion and abuse of his views of the latter president's views, particularly those expressed in The Federalist Papers. With the loss of Hamilton as an intellectual pillar, President Bush's theory of a plenary executive power finds no support among the framers. Analysis of Hamilton's writings will repair his undeserved reputation as an apologist for expansive executive powers.

“…Courts in the first generation of this country's history, they argue, were far more likely to serve as checks on expansive claims of presidential power. Despite this, the scholarly consensus is that presidential war power has vastly expanded since World War II (Fisher 2005; Koh 1990), and many blame Congress for facilitating this trend through excessive delegations of power, poor oversight, and a general lack of will to play a powerful role in foreign affairs (Pious 2007; Wolfensberger 2002). The judiciary has also been accused of aiding and abetting this general expansion of presidential power (Adler 1996; Howell 2003; Ramsey 2007; Sheffer 1999).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The final reason one should not look to the courts to check presidential detention power is that the judiciary has, over time, developed a culture of deference to the president in matters of war powers and foreign affairs (Fisher 2005; Howell 2003; Koh 1990; Rossiter and Longaker 1976; Scigliano 1971). While this deference may have developed in part because the Constitution provides for no express role for the judiciary in war powers matters, some scholars have argued that judicial supervision of the presidency in such matters has been haphazard, with courts only likely to rule against the president when Congress and public opinion are against him, or when the president tries to limit the review power of the judiciary (Cronin and Genovese 2004; Pious 2007).…”

Section: Judicial Deference In War Powers Mattersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Checking Presidential Detention Power in the War on Terror: What Should We Expect from the Judiciary?

Wheeler

2009

When the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first detainee decisions in 2004, many cheered the Court for serving as a check on the George W. Bush administration's unilateral detainee policies. A closer examination, however, reveals that the Bush administration was adept at retaining significant power over detainee matters in spite of the seemingly negative judicial decisions. This article explores four institutional and political factors that, individually and collectively, work to limit the Supreme Court's ability to serve as a significant check on presidential power in the area of detainee affairs in the war on terror. The article concludes that, even if the judiciary is inclined to be active in this area, these factors are likely to constrain any judicial attempts to significantly check presidential detention power in the war on terror.