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Blockchain provides the possibility to design new types of applications and systems that allow their users to store data in a secure and transparent way. In this paper, we design a fully verifiable online electronic voting protocol using a blockchain. Our e-voting protocol, called VYV for Verify-Your-Vote, involves cryptographic primitives based on Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), pairings and Identity Based Encryption (IBE). It ensures the following privacy and security properties: only eligible voter can vote, authentication of the voter, vote privacy, receipt-freeness, fairness, individual and universal verifiability. Furthermore, we formally prove the security of our protocol, using ProVerif tool.

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We relate two different approaches for the specification and verification of hybrid systems. The first one is logic-based and uses the framework of the Calculus of Durations (COD), the second one is automatabased and uses algorithmic analysis techniques for hybrid automata. Fragments of CoD have been identified in [13,19] for the description of control systems and their requirements. We mainly show that the problem of verifying that a CoD control design satisfies a CoD requirement is decidable. This is proved by reducing this verification problem to the reachability problem for a subclass of linear hybrid automata where this problem is decidable.

SUMMARYNoninterference is a strong security policy that enforces confidentiality and integrity. Many solutions are proposed in the state of the art for verifying this policy in programs, but few tools are proposed to implement it. In this paper, we define a high‐level model called Component Information Flow, and we develop the tools that simplify distributed secure system development and deployment.The developer focuses on developing the functional part of his or her system and defines his or her system security properties by using a high‐level configuration. When this configuration is validated, that is, no security leak is detected, the system security code is generated. To validate and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we apply the Component Information Flow tools to a classical Web service use case. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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