2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-32505-3_17
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DABSTERS: A Privacy Preserving e-Voting Protocol for Permissioned Blockchain

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Cited by 11 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Cost evaluation is a testing approach in which writers assess the expenses associated with using their product. It is essential when the Blockchain platform is open to the public and employs a cryptocurrency such as Ethereum, where each action has a cost measured in gas [ 151 , 159 ] conducted three types of tests, while only [ 131 , 183 ] ran four types.…”
Section: Results Presentationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cost evaluation is a testing approach in which writers assess the expenses associated with using their product. It is essential when the Blockchain platform is open to the public and employs a cryptocurrency such as Ethereum, where each action has a cost measured in gas [ 151 , 159 ] conducted three types of tests, while only [ 131 , 183 ] ran four types.…”
Section: Results Presentationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Application is resistant Application is not resistant DDOS [21], [26], [26], [27], [34], [35], [63], [64] [44], [72] [22], [28], [33], [53], [84] [25], [50], [58], [77] Sybil Attack [21], [25], [27], [63] [28] Man of the Middle [44], [53] -Byzantine Fault [20], [25], [27], [31]- [33], [63], [75] [22] Coercion [21], [26], [31] [39], [74], [80], [85] [20], [26]- [28], [33], [53] [33], [40], [41], [45], [50], [60], [78], [86] Brute-Force Attack [23], [87] -DDoS attack because it is almost impossible for the adversary to compromise all the servers. If a DDoS attack occurs, the system will continue to ...…”
Section: Attack/threatmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a system ensures that the coercer cannot be convinced of how a voter is voting, even if the voter cooperates with the coercer. As illustrated in Table 3, apart from a few exceptions [21], [26], [31] [39], [74], [80], [85], several applications are susceptible to this type of attack [20], [26]- [28], [33], [53] [33], [40], [41], [45], [50], [60], [78], [86] because it is impossible to prevent a user from voting in front of someone else or selling his key. This is a major flaw of e-voting that is unfortunately almost impossible to overcome today.…”
Section: Attack/threatmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Furthermore, confidentiality of the individual vote is a fundamental component of a voting system however default settings within blockchain do not fulfil this requirement. Consequently, recent efforts such as [41] have focused at achieving privacy-aware voting overlaying blockchain technology to fulfil this requirement. With respect to double utilization in e-voting, existing approaches rely on the assumptions that majority of computing resources are controlled by honest miners.…”
Section: Blockchain-based E-votingmentioning
confidence: 99%