Background.-The degree to which individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) evidence impairments in episodic memory relative to their typically developing (TD) counterparts remains unclear. According to a prominent view, ASD is associated with deficits in encoding associations between items and recollecting precise context details. Here, we evaluated behavioral and neural evidence for this impaired relational binding hypothesis using a task involving relational encoding and recollection during fMRI.Methods.-Adolescents and young adults (N ASD =47; N TD =60) performed the Relational and Item-Specific Encoding (RiSE) task during fMRI, including item and associative recognition testing. We modelled functional recruitment within the medial temporal lobes (MTL), and connectivity between MTL and the posterior medial (PM) network thought to underlie relational memory. The impaired relational binding model would predict a behavioral deficit driven by aberrant recruitment and connectivity of MTL and the PM network.Results.-The ASD and TD groups showed indistinguishable item and associative recognition performance. During relational encoding, the ASD group demonstrated increased hippocampal recruitment, and decreased connectivity between MTL and PM regions relative to TD. Within ASD, hippocampal recruitment and MTL-PM connectivity were inversely correlated.Conclusions.-The lack of a behavioral deficit in ASD does not support the impaired relational binding hypothesis. Instead, the current data suggest that increased recruitment of the hippocampus compensates for decreased MTL-PM connectivity to support preserved episodic

Adaptive behavior requires learning about the structure of one’s environment to derive optimal action policies, and previous studies have documented transfer of such structural knowledge to bias choices in new environments. Here, we asked whether people could also acquire and transfer more abstract knowledge across different task environments, specifically expectations about cognitive control demands. Over three experiments, participants (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers; N = ~80 adults per group) performed a probabilistic card-sorting task in environments of either a low or high volatility of task rule changes (requiring low or high cognitive flexibility, respectively) before transitioning to a medium-volatility environment. Using reinforcement-learning modeling, we consistently found that previous exposure to high task rule volatilities led to faster adaptation to rule changes in the subsequent transfer phase. These transfers of expectations about cognitive flexibility demands were both task independent (Experiment 2) and stimulus independent (Experiment 3), thus demonstrating the formation and generalization of environmental structure knowledge to guide cognitive control.

Increased attention to threat is considered a core feature of anxiety. However, there are multiple mechanisms of attention and multiple types of threat, and the relationships among attention, threat, and anxiety are poorly understood. In the present study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to separately isolate attentional selection (N2pc) and suppression (PD) of pictorial threats (photos of weapons, snakes, etc.) and conditioned threats (colored shapes paired with electric shock). In a sample of 48 young adults, both threat types were initially selected for increased attention (an N2pc), but only conditioned threats elicited subsequent suppression (a PD) and a reaction time (RT) bias. Levels of trait anxiety were unrelated to N2pc amplitude, but increased anxiety was associated with larger PDs (i.e., greater suppression) and reduced RT bias to conditioned threats. These results suggest that anxious individuals do not pay more attention to threats but rather engage more attentional suppression to overcome threats.

No abstract

Adaptive behavior requires the ability to focus on a current task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability), as well as the ability to rapidly switch to another task in light of changing circumstances (cognitive flexibility). Cognitive stability and flexibility have been conceptualized as opposite endpoints on a stability-flexibility trade-off continuum, implying an obligatory reciprocity between the two: Greater flexibility necessitates less stability, and vice versa. Surprisingly, rigorous empirical tests of this critical assumption are lacking. Here, we acquired simultaneous measurements of cognitive stability (congruency effects) and flexibility (switch costs) on the same stimuli within the same task while independently varying contextual demands on these functions with block-wise manipulations of the proportion of incongruent trials and task switches, respectively. If cognitive stability and flexibility are reciprocal, increases in flexibility in response to higher switch rates should lead to commensurate decreases in stability, and increases in stability in response to more frequent incongruent trials should result in decreased flexibility. Across three experiments, using classic cued task-switching (Experiments 1 and 3) and attentional set-shifting (Experiment 2) protocols, we found robust evidence against an obligatory stability-flexibility trade-off. Although we observed the expected contextual adaptation of stability and flexibility to changing demands, strategic adjustments in stability had little influence on flexibility, and vice versa. These results refute the long-held assumption of a stability-flexibility trade-off, documenting instead that the cognitive processes mediating these functions can be regulated independently-it is possible to be both stable and flexible at the same time.

Despite the clinically significant impact of executive dysfunction on the outcomes of adolescents and young adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), we lack a clear understanding of its prevalence, profile, and development. To address this gap, we administered the NIH Toolbox Cognition Battery to a cross‐sectional Intelligence Quotient (IQ) case‐matched cohort with ASD (n = 66) and typical development (TD; n = 66) ages 12–22. We used a general linear model framework to examine group differences in task performance and their associations with age. Latent profile analysis (LPA) was used to identify subgroups of individuals with similar cognitive profiles. Compared to IQ case‐matched controls, ASD demonstrated poorer performance on inhibitory control (P < 0.001), cognitive flexibility (P < 0.001), episodic memory (P < 0.02), and processing speed (P < 0.001) (components of Fluid Cognition), but not on vocabulary or word reading (components of Crystallized Cognition). There was a significant positive association between age and Crystallized and Fluid Cognition in both groups. For Fluid (but not Crystallized) Cognition, ASD performed more poorly than TD at all ages. A four‐group LPA model based on subtest scores best fit the data. Eighty percent of ASD belonged to two groups that exhibited relatively stronger Crystallized versus Fluid Cognition. Attention deficits were not associated with Toolbox subtest scores, but were lowest in the group with the lowest proportion of autistic participants. Adaptive functioning was poorer in the groups with the greatest proportion of autistic participants. Autistic persons are especially impaired on Fluid Cognition, and this more flexible form of thinking remains poorer in the ASD group through adolescence. Lay Summary A set of brief tests of cognitive functioning called the NIH Toolbox Cognition Battery was administered to adolescents and young adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD; n = 66) and typical development (TD; n = 66) ages 12–22 years. Compared to TD, ASD showed poorer performance in inhibiting responses, acting flexibly, memorizing events, and processing information quickly (Fluid Cognition). Groups did not differ on vocabulary or word reading (Crystallized Cognition). Crystallized and Fluid Cognition increased with age in both groups, but the ASD group showed lower Fluid, but not Crystallized, Cognition than TD at all ages. A categorization analysis including all participants showed that most participants with ASD fell into one of two categories: a group characterized by poor performance across all tasks, or a group characterized by relatively stronger Crystallized compared to Fluid Cognition. Adaptive functioning was poorer for participants in these groups, which consisted of mostly individuals with ASD, while ADHD symptoms were lowest in the group with the greatest proportion of TD participants.

Adaptive behavior requires learning about the structure of the environment to derive optimal action policies, and previous studies have documented transfer of such structural knowledge to bias choices in new environments. Here, we asked whether people could also acquire and transfer more abstract knowledge across different task environments, in particular, expectations about demands on cognitive control. Over three experiments, participants performed a probabilistic card-sorting task in environments of either a low or high volatility of task rule changes (requiring low or high cognitive flexibility) before transitioning to a medium-volatility environment. Using reinforcement learning modeling, we consistently found that previous exposure to high task rule volatility led to faster adaptation to rule changes in the subsequent transfer phase. This transfer of expectations about demands on cognitive flexibility was both task- (Experiment 2) and stimulus- (Experiment 3) independent, thus demonstrating the formation and generalization of environmental structure knowledge to guide cognitive control.

Adaptive behavior requires the ability to focus on a current task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability) as well as the ability to rapidly switch to another task in light of changing circumstances (cognitive flexibility). Cognitive stability and flexibility have commonly been conceptualized as opposite endpoints on a stability-flexibility tradeoff continuum, implying an obligatory reciprocity between the two: greater flexibility necessitates less stability, and vice versa. Surprisingly, rigorous empirical tests of this critical assumption are lacking, however. Here, we tested this assumption by acquiring simultaneous measurements of cognitive stability (congruency effects) and flexibility (switch costs) while independently varying contextual demands on these functions with block-wise manipulations of the proportion of incongruent trials and task switches, respectively. If cognitive stability and flexibility are reciprocal, an increase in flexibility in response to higher switch rates should lead to a commensurate decrease in stability, and an increase in stability in response to more frequent incongruent trials should result in decreased flexibility. Across three experiments, using classic cued task switching (Experiments 1 and 3) and attentional set shifting (Experiment 2) protocols, we found robust evidence against an obligatory stability-flexibility tradeoff. Although we observed the expected contextual adaptation of stability and flexibility to changing demands, strategic adjustments in stability had no influence on flexibility, and vice versa. These results refute the long-held assumption of a stability-flexibility tradeoff, documenting instead that the cognitive processes mediating these functions can be regulated independently - it is possible to be both stable and flexible at the same time.