Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.

People are capable, at will, of trading speed for accuracy when performing a task; they can focus on performing accurately at the cost of being slow, or emphasize speed at the cost of decreased accuracy. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural correlates of this ability. We show increased baseline activity during speed emphasis in a network of areas related to response preparation and execution, including the premotor areas of the frontal lobe, the basal ganglia, the thalamus, and the dorsolateral prefrontal and left parietal cortices. Furthermore, speed emphasis was associated with reduced transient response-related activation in several of these structures, suggesting that because of the greater baseline activity under speed emphasis, less activation is needed in these structures to reach response threshold, consistent with the assumptions of several computational theories. Moreover, we identify the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as providing the top-down control signal that increases this baseline activity.

When our actions conflict with our prior attitudes, we often change our attitudes to be more consistent with our actions. This phenomenon, known as cognitive dissonance, is considered to be one of the most influential theories in psychology. However, the neural basis of this phenomenon is unknown. Using a Solomon four-group design, we scanned participants with functional MRI while they argued that the uncomfortable scanner environment was nevertheless a pleasant experience. We found that cognitive dissonance engaged the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula; furthermore, we found that the activation of these regions tightly predicted participants' subsequent attitude change. These effects were not observed in a control group. Our findings elucidate the neural representation of cognitive dissonance, and support the role of the anterior cingulate cortex in detecting cognitive conflict and the neural prediction of attitude change.

Cognitive control forms a foundation for higher cognitive functions such as attention, memory retrieval, and language production and comprehension. Cognitive control allows us to coordinate or direct lower level or more automatic processes to ensure that our resulting actions will be in line with our goals and to successfully perform difficult tasks, even in the face of distraction. While the behavioral and neural mechanisms of cognitive control are well characterized, a growing body of literature regarding the influence of emotional states and emotional stimuli on performance of goal-related behaviors and neural activity has yielded discrepant results. Conflict and Control in Nonemotional TasksOne particular function of cognitive control is the selection of a correct response from competing responses. In the color-word Stroop task, subjects are required to name the color in which a color word is displayed (Stroop, 1935). On congruent trials, the color and meaning of the word are the same (e.g., the word blue written in blue). Responses on these trials are generally quick and accurate. On incongruent trials, the color and the meaning of the word are not the same (e.g., the word blue written in red). Performance is slower and less accurate on incongruent trials because of the presence of conflict. During these types of trials, cognitive control is needed for the subject to respond with the correct color-naming response ("red") as opposed to the incorrect and conflicting automatic word-reading response ("blue").Behavioral studies have shown that responses to incongruent trials preceded by another incongruent trial (iI trials) are considerably faster and more accurate than responses to incongruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (cI trials; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). Performance on iI trials is improved because of a strengthening of selection for action or control. On cI trials, performance is poor, because control is not yet implemented and levels of conflict are high.In an event-related fMRI study of the color-word Stroop task, Kerns et al. (2004) found that a fast iI trial was associated with high dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity and high dorsol anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activity on the preceding incongruent (cI) trial. This study helped establish the role of the dACC as the conflict monitor and the role of a separate and distinct area, the DLPFC, in subsequent cognitive control. These results have since been replicated in several neuroimaging studies (Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008;Egner & Hirsch, 2005;Kerns, 2006), and Egner and Hirsch (2005) later showed that DLPFC improves task performance by enhancing processing of the task-relevant stimulus dimension. Conflict and Control in Emotional TasksThe results described above account for the cognitive and neural underpinnings of conflict detection and subsequent control-related adjustments during cognitive tasks. However, in real-world situations, we must con- 357© 2010 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.Adding fear to conflict: A ge...

It is unequivocal that a wide variety of incentives can motivate behavior. However, few studies have explicitly examined whether and how different incentives are integrated in terms of their motivational influence. The current study examines the combined effects of monetary and liquid incentives on cognitive processing, and whether appetitive and aversive incentives have distinct influences. We introduce a novel task paradigm, in which participants perform cued task-switching for monetary rewards that vary parametrically across trials, with liquid incentives serving as post-trial performance feedback. Critically, the symbolic meaning of the liquid was held constant (indicating successful reward attainment), while liquid valence was blocked. In the first experiment, monetary rewards combined additively with appetitive liquid feedback to improve subject task performance. Aversive liquid feedback counteracted monetary reward effects in low monetary reward trials, particularly in a subset of participants who tended to avoid responding under these conditions. Self-report motivation ratings predicted behavioral performance above and beyond experimental effects. A follow-up experiment replicated the predictive power of motivation ratings even when only appetitive liquids were used, suggesting that ratings reflect idiosyncratic subjective values of, rather than categorical differences between, the liquid incentives. Together, the findings indicate an integrative relationship between primary and secondary incentives and potentially dissociable influences in modulating motivational value, while informing hypotheses regarding candidate neural mechanisms.

In classic Stroop paradigms, increasing the proportion of control-demanding incongruent trials results in strategic adjustments in behavior and implementation of cognitive control processes. We manipulated expectancy for incongruent trials in an emotional facial Stroop task to investigate the behavioral and neural effects of proportion manipulation in a cognitively demanding task with emotional stimuli. Subjects performed a high expectancy (HE) task (65% incongruent trials) and a low expectancy (LE) task (35% incongruent trials) during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). As in standard Stroop tasks, behavioral interference was reduced in the emotional facial Stroop HE task compared to the LE task. Functional MRI data revealed a switch in cognitive control strategy, from a reactive, event-related activation of a medial and lateral cognitive control network and right amygdala in the LE task to a proactive, sustained activation of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in the HE task. Higher trait anxiety was associated with impairment (slower response time and decreased accuracy) as well as reduced activity in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, and orbitofrontal cortex in the HE task on high conflict trials with task-irrelevant emotional information, suggesting that individual differences in anxiety may be associated with expectancy-related strategic control adjustments, particularly when emotional stimuli must be ignored.

The present findings provide novel evidence for a specific link between SN-DMN overconnectivity and internalizing in ASD. Further, the mediation results suggest that intact anterior insula-retrosplenial connectivity may play a role in an individual's generating insight into his or her own psychopathology.

Background.-The degree to which individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) evidence impairments in episodic memory relative to their typically developing (TD) counterparts remains unclear. According to a prominent view, ASD is associated with deficits in encoding associations between items and recollecting precise context details. Here, we evaluated behavioral and neural evidence for this impaired relational binding hypothesis using a task involving relational encoding and recollection during fMRI.Methods.-Adolescents and young adults (N ASD =47; N TD =60) performed the Relational and Item-Specific Encoding (RiSE) task during fMRI, including item and associative recognition testing. We modelled functional recruitment within the medial temporal lobes (MTL), and connectivity between MTL and the posterior medial (PM) network thought to underlie relational memory. The impaired relational binding model would predict a behavioral deficit driven by aberrant recruitment and connectivity of MTL and the PM network.Results.-The ASD and TD groups showed indistinguishable item and associative recognition performance. During relational encoding, the ASD group demonstrated increased hippocampal recruitment, and decreased connectivity between MTL and PM regions relative to TD. Within ASD, hippocampal recruitment and MTL-PM connectivity were inversely correlated.Conclusions.-The lack of a behavioral deficit in ASD does not support the impaired relational binding hypothesis. Instead, the current data suggest that increased recruitment of the hippocampus compensates for decreased MTL-PM connectivity to support preserved episodic