We find that relative to fundamentals, dual-class firms trade at lower prices than do single-class firms both at the IPO date and for at least the subsequent five years. The lower prices attached to dual-class firms do not foreshadow abnormally low stock or accounting returns. However, CEO turnover events do occur less frequently among dual-class firms and the circumstances surrounding CEO turnover vary between single-and dual-class companies. When dual-class firms unify their share classes statistically and economically significant value gains occur. Collectively, our results suggest that the governance associated with dual-class equity influences the pricing of dual-class firms.

This paper analyzes 31 months of data on 137 single-stock futures (SSFs) traded on OneChicago. The results indicate that on the days they trade, SSFs contribute approximately 24% of the price discovery for underlying stocks. Information revelation in the SSFs market decreases with the ratio of spreads in the futures and the stock markets and the volatility in the stock market. Moreover, the quality of the market for the underlying stocks improves substantially after the introduction of the SSFs market, with the largest improvement occurring on days with SSFs trading.

We find that relative to fundamentals, dual-class firms trade at lower prices than do single-class firms both at the IPO date and for at least the subsequent five years. The lower prices attached to dual-class firms do not foreshadow abnormally low stock or accounting returns. However, CEO turnover events do occur less frequently among dual-class firms and the circumstances surrounding CEO turnover vary between single-and dual-class companies. When dual-class firms unify their share classes statistically and economically significant value gains occur. Collectively, our results suggest that the governance associated with dual-class equity influences the pricing of dual-class firms.

Half‐hour returns predict same‐half‐hour returns on subsequent days. We hypothesize that this is due to institutional traders who execute their parent orders over multiple days (“repetitive institutional traders”). Using a unique data set that provides masked trader identification and trader type, we find that the half‐hour net order submission activity of repetitive institutional traders is predictive of same‐half‐hour returns on subsequent days, and that this relation subsumes the return predictability at shorter intervals. Repetitive institutional traders incur lower transaction costs than their nonrepetitive counterparts, suggesting that other traders compete to provide liquidity to the anticipated order flow originating from the repetitive traders.

No abstract