Using unique borrower-level data, we study the causal effect of debt relief on the loan performance of distressed and nondistressed borrowers. We employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits exogenous cutoff dates underlying the 2008 Indian debt waiver program to separate defaulters on loans into beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries of waivers. By identifying distress before the waiver program using exogenous borrower-level shocks, we examine performance on loans originated after the waiver program. Loan performance of nondistressed beneficiaries worsens, while that of distressed borrowers improves. While existing studies aggregate the effects of debt relief across distressed and non distressed borrowers, we highlight crucial differences between them. We would like to thank Dhammika Dharmapala and two anonymous referees for their thoughtful feedback.
We examine the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in banks. Incoming bank CEOs face problems of information asymmetry because banks’ operations are opaque and bank risk can change dramatically in a short time. These CEOs may therefore change bank policies to manage their personal risks. Since CEO turnover is usually endogenous, we utilize a setting in which CEO turnover is based solely on retirement age and is thus exogenous to bank performance. Consistent with our thesis, incoming CEOs increase provisioning for future delinquencies and shrink lending. Bank stock prices decline following these changes. Politically motivated lending or ever-greening cannot explain our results.
This study investigates the implementation of a Government of India mandate that requires firms to spend at least 2% of their profits on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The results show that qualifying firms that voluntarily engaged in CSR before the mandate reduce their CSR spending afterward. Despite increasing advertisement expenditure likely to offset the lost signaling value of voluntary CSR, stock prices and operating performance of former voluntary CSR spenders who qualify under the law decline. Our results sug-
We examine the Indian bank asset quality review, which doubled the declared loan delinquency rate. Relative economic stability during the exercise and the absence of a capital backstop together make it unique. We find that the expected reduction in information asymmetry does not automatically lead to the recapitalization of banks by markets. The consequent undercapitalization leads to underinvestment and risk-shifting through zombie lending. The impact flows to the real economy through borrowers, including shadow banks, and adversely impacts growth. These findings show that bank cleanup exercises not accompanied by policies aimed at recapitalization may be insufficient even during normal times.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.