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Purpose The Indian Companies Act 2013 mandated auditor rotations in the financial year 2018–2019. Similar regulations are being considered in many countries, based on the assumption that longer tenure is detrimental to audit quality; yet, the evidence from investigations of this assumption is inconclusive. This paper aims to examine the effect of moderating factors on the relation between audit quality and audit tenure, given the regulatory trend and the lack of consensus in extant literature. Design/methodology/approach This paper examines the relationship between audit quality and audit tenure among Indian firms from 2001 to 2015 and tests for moderating factors including auditor compensation, business group affiliation and chief executive officer (CEO) duality. Findings Contrary to the objective of mandatory rotations, this study finds that longer auditor tenure generally enhanced audit quality among Indian firms prior to mandatory rotations. However, for companies paying abnormally high compensation to auditors, this paper finds that longer tenure decreases audit quality, particularly if the firm is affiliated with a business group or firms where the CEO also serves as the board chair. Thus, the potential benefits of mandated shorter tenure appear to be confined to high-fee paying companies with a business group affiliation and/or a dual-role CEO. Originality/value This study is one of the first to examine conditioning factors that affect the relationship between audit quality and auditor tenure. Results suggest that regulations limiting auditor tenure would be beneficial only to the shareholders of a narrow group of firms; while for the majority of firms, limiting auditor tenure may actually be counter-productive.

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