Abstract:The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries. 710 Résumé : Les échecs des aménagements traditionnels centrés sur les espèces-cibles ont incité plusieurs chercheurs à proposer des approches halieutiques basées sur les écosystèmes pour favoriser les pêches durables. L'approche écosys-témique est nécessaire, en particulier, pour tenir compte des interactions pêche-écosystème; elle ne suffit pas, cependant, par elle-même pour régler deux facteurs importants qui contribuent à rendre les pêches non durables : les incitations insuffisantes pour les pêcheurs et la gestion inefficace souvent présente dans les pêches commerciales déve-loppées qui sont régies principalement par des limites à la récolte totale et par des contrôles d'entrée. Nous croyons qu'on doit mettre beaucoup plus l'accent sur la motivation des pêcheurs dans la gestion de la pêche. En utilisant des données provenant de plus d'une douzaine d'expériences naturelles de pêche commerciale, nous cherchons à démontrer que des approches fondées sur les incitations qui précisent mieux la communauté, les récoltes individuelles et les droits territoriaux et qui évaluent aussi financièrement les services de l'écosystème, couplées avec de la recherche gouvernementale, de la surveillance et de la gestion efficace, promeuvent les pêches commerciales durables.[Traduit par la Rédaction] Grafton et al.

The evidence for nonnormality of crop yields is reassessed. Three methodological problems are identified in typical yield distribution analyses: (i) misspecification of the nonrandom components of yield distributions, (ii) missreporting of statistical significance, and (iii) use of aggregate timeseries (ATS) data to represent farm-level yield distributions. One or more of these problems infect virtually all evidence against normality to date. The positive contribution of the article is a set of principles that must be followed in any valid investigation of yield normality. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

We develop a dynamic model of a fishery which simultaneously incorporates random stock growth and costly capital adjustment. Numerical techniques are used to solve for the resource-rent-maximizing harvest and capital investment policies. Capital rigidities bring diminishing marginal returns to the current period harvest, and introduce an incentive to smooth the catch over time. With density dependent stock growth, however, catch smoothing increases stock variability resulting in reduced average yields. The optimal management policy balances the catch smoothing benefits against yield loss. We calibrate the model to the Alaskan pacific halibut fishery to demonstrate the main insights.

Delayed fishing fleet restructuring complicates the assessment of efficiency gains from individual transferable quota (ITQ) fisheries management programs. This article presents a methodology to estimate harvest sector efficiency gains in lieu of incomplete fleet restructuring. The methodology is applied to assess the efficiency gains in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery ITQ program. While roughly 128 vessels harvested clams under the previous management regime, the analysis suggests that 21–25 vessels will remain under lTQs. The efficiency gains are estimated to be between $11.1 million and $12.8 million annually (1990 dollars). Copyright 1998, Oxford University Press.

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, "meetings with costly participation", (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2005.

Abstract. This paper considers the problem of multi-species fisheries management when targeting individual species is costly and at-sea discards of fish by fishermen are unobserved by the regulator. Stock conditions, ecosystem interaction, technological specification, and relative prices under which at sea discards are acute are identified. A dynamic model is developed to balance ecological interdependencies among multiple fish species, and scope economies implicit in a costly targeting technology. Three regulatory regimes, species-specific harvest quotas, landing taxes, and revenue quotas, are contrasted against a hypothetical sole owner problem. An optimal plan under all regimes precludes discarding. For both very low and very high levels of targeting costs, first best welfare is close to that achieved through any of the regulatory regimes. In general, however, landing taxes welfare dominate species-specific quota regulation; a revenue quota fares the worst. JEL Classification: Q2

Controlled access management in the northern Gulf of Mexico commercial reef …sh …shery has failed to achieve economic and biological objectives. This paper estimates the economic bene…ts of replacing controlled access with a system of tradable harvest permits. Using 1993 data, we estimate that eliminating market gluts caused by periodic seasonal closures could increase revenues by $3.068m. Harvest cost savings from eliminating per-trip catch limits and periodic seasonal closures are estimated to be $8.547m. Total 1993 bene…ts are estimated at $11.614m suggesting a property rights-based management program is an attractive alternative in the northern Gulf reef …sh …shery.

A Cournot model of investment is used to characterize the pre-and post-buyback investment equilibrium for vessels operating in a total-allowable-catch-regulated fishery. Welfare effects -the net welfare gains or losses and the distributional effects -that may be expected from vessel buyback programs are identified. Net welfare effects depend on the ability of remaining vessels to replace buyback capital, the speed of capital replacement, and capital investment irreversibility. Net welfare effects are likely to be positive only under exceptional technological and capital-market conditions. A brief review of the British Columbia Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan is presented to anchor the theoretical model. JEL Classification: Q28, D24Programmes de rachats de vaisseaux dans les pêches commerciales: efficacité versus transferts. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle d investissement à la Cournot pour analyser la situatioǹ d équilibre d'investissement avant et après le rachat de vaisseaux opérant dans des pêches où le total des prises permises est réglementé. Les effets de bien-être -les effets nets de gains ou de pertes et les effets de redistribution -qu on peut anticiper de programmes dè rachats de vaisseaux sont identifiés. Les effets nets de bien-être dépendent de la capacité des vaisseaux qui restent en service à remplacer le capital racheté, de la vitesse avec laquelle le capital est remplacé, et de l'irréversibilité de la capitalisation. Les effets nets de bien-être sont susceptibles d'être positifs seulement dans des conditions exceptionnelles sur le plan technologique et pour ce qui est du marché du capital. Les auteurs examinent le plan de revitalisation du saumon du Pacifique de la Colombie Britannique pour donner un point d ancrage au modèle théorique.